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Abstract 
 
Public housing policy plays an important role in the economy and the society in Hong 
Kong. Approximately half of Hong Kong’s citizens live in some form of public 
housing, either public rental, assisted home ownership or tenant purchase of public 
rental housing. Therefore, every change made in the public housing policy also affects 
the demand and supply of the private property market directly, and thus developers 
are also concerned with the development of the policy. In 2010, the prices of private 
developments reached a peak comparable to that reached in 1997. Many people from 
different areas, including Legislative Council members and even developers, asked 
the government to regulate such price growth. One of the proposed methods is to 
reinstate the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) 
so as to provide some affordable housing for those people who want to own their 
shelter. Although the government still has not launched any measures to control the 
rapidly rising private property market, this debate contributed to many people 
becoming aware again of the TPS policy. It was a privatization policy for public rental 
housing, which was established in 1998 and terminated in 2002. More than 95,000 
public housing units in 39 estates were sold to the sitting tenants. It was considered as 
a successful privatization policy at that time with a high subscription rate. However, 
due to the economic downturn in 1999 following the Asian Financial Crisis, the 
government stopped the TPS. The last phase of sale was carried out in 2002. 
 
Many scholars conducted research into the impact of the TPS on the economy and 
society in Hong Kong, including, for example, studying the impact on the private 
property market as a consequence of launching the TPS, and the social impact of 
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privatizing the public rental estates. Nonetheless, there are limited numbers of 
research studies that examine the building management of the TPS, even though there 
has been an increasing number of property management conflicts over the years. The 
overall aim of this dissertation is to conduct an investigation into the nature and 
mechanisms of building management of estate in the TPS scheme, by reviewing 
literature and experience from other countries and by analysing the causes of the 
conflicts through case studies. The overall findings of the study indicate that an 
incomplete Deed of Mutual Covenant between estate residents, and a lack of 
motivation to manage estates properly by the Hong Kong Housing Authority, are the 
principal causes of estate management conflicts. 
 
In this dissertation, a number of literatures will be reviewed in order to have a clear 
definition and concept in examining the propositions, for example, privatization, 
mixed tenure, behavioral economic, building management in Hong Kong, etc. 
Moreover, the operational system and structure of the TPS will be studied in order to 
see the clear picture of a TPS estate.  After that, the problems of the TPS will be 
found out by examining the flaw of the management and operation system of the TPS. 
The propositions will be drawn. Finally, a detail analysis will be carried out by 
conducting various case studies on different case so as to proof the propositions where 
the main source of evidence is the secondary documentation data. 
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Chapter 1    Introduction 
 
Public Housing was introduced in Hong Kong after the great fire occurred in Shek Kip Mei in 
1953. Until now, this term is still irreplaceable and vital in the society since nearly half of the 
population in Hong Kong is living in public housing. Over the fifty years development in the 
society, the structure and direction of the public housing policy had changed and reformed 
several times.  
 
One of the major variations of the public housing policy was the form of subsidization in 
providing accommodations to the needs which was proposed in the Long Term Housing 
Strategy (LTHS) in 1987. The direction was shifting from “subsidy in kind” to “subsidy in 
cash” (So, 2002). During that period of time, government was trying to help residents in 
public rental housing (PRH) buying their own shelters. The reasons behind were to reduce the 
burden in operating the PRH and to promote the ownership rate in Hong Kong 
 
Privatization of the PRH is the most direct method in achieving the aims mentioned above. In 
1997, Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) was launched to privatize the PRH units in the 
designated housing estates. In fact, there were some schemes for selling the PRH units before, 
but the scale was small and the result was disappointed. After the implementation of TPS, it 
was regarded as the most influential and popular tools to promote home ownership rate.  
 
However, there was a large debate on whether privatization of public housing is good to the 
society. After the great changes in the economy and the government policies from 1997 to 
2002, TPS was terminated because of the neutral role of government in the real estate market. 
The last stage of selling was held in 2006.  
 2 
 
Nevertheless, it has not come to an end. Residents living in the designated estates under the 
TPS have the right to choose whether they buy their units. As a result, those estates alter from 
signal tenure to mixed tenure. It is not surprised that conflicts are occurred due to this change. 
Moreover, the management structure of those estates is also different. As the TPS estates are 
private property, according to the Building Management Ordinance (BMO) Cap.344, Owners’ 
Corporation (OC) must be set up to manage the properties. That means the properties in a 
TPS estate, including owners and tenants, will be managed by OC instead of the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority (HA).The role of HA in the TPS estate has changed from sole owner and 
property manager to the owner of the tenants who do not but their PRH units only. Thus, 
tenants can only deliver their voice through HA. On the other hand, the management and 
maintenance of common areas and public facilities are also the responsibility of the OC. All 
the expenditures are shared among the owners according to the Deed of Mutual Covenant 
(DMC). It makes a huge burden to those owners. 
 
Over more than 10 years operation of TPS estate, there are different opinions towards the TPS. 
Also, many problems are also evolved in running those estates. Now, writer thinks that it is a 
good opportunity to make use of the past 10 years experiences and data to evaluate the TPS 
specified in the building management aspect. 
 
 
1.1. The Background of the Hong Kong Rental Public Housing 
 
The direction of public housing has changed many times. It has moved from squatter 
resettlement to provision of low-cost housing for low-income families and subsequently to the 
provision of home-ownership units for middle-income families (Yu, 1998). Finally, after 
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serious economic downturn, HKSAR government restated the role of public housing in the 
real estate market. The public housing is only used for providing low-cost housing to 
low-income families by renting only. Therefore, in order to see the whole picture of public 
housing and understand the rationales of TPS, it is time to understanding more about the 
development of Hong Kong public housing development. 
 
Hong Kong’s public housing programme started in 1954 in the aftermath of the Shek Kip Mei 
fire occurred in the Christmas Eve of 1953. No one will deny that the tragedy is the beginning 
of public housing in Hong Kong history. Before this melodrama, the government policy in 
housing was that of laissez-faire, and subsidized housing of any form was virtually 
nonexistent. However, after that accident, the government embarked on a large scale public 
housing program, which was to build large scale public housing to settle the victims in Shek 
Kip Mei fire. This mass development was mainly under the custody of the Resettlement 
Department at that time. It was clearly stated by the Commissioner for Resettlement in 1955 
that “they are settled because the community can no longer afford to carry the fire risk, health 
risk and threat to public order and prestige… because the community needs the land of which 
they are in illegal occupation” (Mclaughlin, 1987). As the main objective was to settle 
squatters in order to clear land for development, little attention was paid to the quality of 
housing. 
The Passive Era (1954-1964) 
 
In 1965, a first ten year building programme was introduced. It was known as the Mackinsey 
Administrative Reform which aimed to house on average 220,000 people each year (Yu, 
1998). It was economically supportive to launch a large scale housing programme for the 
Ten year Building Programme (1965-1973) 
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purpose to provide cheap and contented labour for the thriving manufacturing industry 
(Castells, 1988). However, only around 50% of initial target was achieved which was shown 
in Table 1.1. 
    Source: Castells, God and Kwok (1990) 
 
 
The housing programme has been entered into a new era with Sir Murray MacLehose’s 
arrangement in 1972 that future stability and prosperity of Hong Kong would be built on 
“four pillars” of social policy which were public housing, education, health care and social 
services (Mclaughin, 1987). In public housing aspect, there were several plans in developing 
public housing. Firstly, the government committed to provide better quality housing. It also 
envisaged the rehousing of 1.8 million population at a minimum of 35 sq. ft. per person and 
Ten year Housing Programme (1965-1973) 
               Table 1.1  
Ten-year Building Programme from 1965 to 1973 
 
Category of Agency and 
Type of Housing Unit 
Target Number of 
Persons to be Housed 
Actual Production 
Persons No. of Flats 
Resettlement Estate 1,900,000 661,000 130,000 
Government Low Cost 
Housing 
290,000 200,000 68,000 
Housing Authority 85,000 105,000 18,000 
Housing Society  74,000 13,000 
Total 2,275,000 1,040,000 229,000 
Annual Average 220,000 100,000 23,000 
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the provision of permanent, self-contained housing for everyone in Hong Kong within the 
10-year period through public housing development in new towns and market towns in rural 
New Territories (Keung, 1985). Moreover, what is the most important thing in this ten-year 
housing programme was the introduction of HOS which was regarded as the evolution of 
public housing. It is because the objective of HOS is to promote home ownership rate in Hong 
Kong. From the number of applications of HOS, the introduction of HOS was considered a 
successful scheme in increasing home ownership rate.  However, the ten year housing 
programme was not so successful since the target was set too high for providing 
self-contained housing. Furthermore, mass public housing development was taken up in New 
Territories which caused the massive population decentralization. There has been a spatial 
mismatch between the population and jobs. Also, the planned transport infrastructure had 
proven incapable of coping with such demand, and bypass routes and new tunnels had to be 
built after the construction of new towns (Yu, 1998) 
 
In this stage, there were two very important documents issued which changed the direction of 
public housing in Hong Kong. The first one was “A Review of Public Housing Allocation 
Policies”. The main objective was to review the criteria of the public housing tenants because 
debate on whether well-off tenants should continue to occupy public rental housing because 
there were more and more needy families on the General Waiting List since the 1970s (Yu, 
1998).  
Public Housing Reform (1984-1997) 
 
The second one was, more importantly, the Long Term Housing Strategy (LTHS). It specified 
its dependency on private sector development and the attraction of more public housing 
tenants into the HOS. It included two key housing goals in the LTHS which were helping all 
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households gaining access to adequate and affordable housing and encouraging home 
ownership in the community. The objective of LTHS was obvious. It wanted more investment 
on the private housing market which was the prologue of large scale privatization in next 
stage. 
 
From 1997 to 2003, it could be said that it was a dramatic period for public housing. The 
cause of this incident was started from the first two policy addresses right after the handover 
of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to China.  
The Home Ownership Era (1997-2002) 
 
In the policy address in 1997, one of the focuses was on the home ownership. The 
government aimed to ensure that sufficient quality subsidized home ownership flats are 
provided to enable people in the relevant income groups to buy their own homes. Furthermore, 
sufficient incentives are in place to encourage public housing rental housing tenants to 
upgrade to home ownership (Policy Address, 1997). 
 
In the policy address in 1998, a historic and renowned housing policy was made which is 
called “85,000 Policy”. The aim was to build 85,000 flats a year comprising 50,000 flats in 
public sector and 35,000 flats in private sector which begins from 1999 to 2007. Moreover, 
this policy address also set a target of 70% home ownership rate by 2007.  
 
The motive in housing of these two policy addresses was not difficult to understand. The 
government wanted to increase the ownership rate in order to reduce the burden of public 
housing. The details of increasing home ownership rate will be discussed in the next part. 
However, it was remarkable moment for rental public housing in Hong Kong since it started 
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to be privatized. 
 
Due to serious economic downturn in Asia, the housing policies implemented in the 1997 and 
1998 policies did not work, including “85,000 Policy”. Those policies even made the situation 
worse. No one demand in private housing. The large supply in HOS and TPS made the private 
housing market declined. Many developers blamed for intervention of private housing market.  
The Relocation of Public Housing (2002-Present) 
 
After a large debate, the Secretary for Housing, Planning and Lands made the Statement of 
Housing Policy in November 2002 ultimately. There were three objectives in the Statement of 
Housing Policy which made a turning point for public housing again.  
• The focus of the Government’s subsidized housing policy should be on the provision of 
assistance to low-income families who cannot afford private rental accommodation. 
• The Government should minimize its intervention in the private property market. 
• The Government should minimize a fair and stable operating environment for the private 
property market by ensuring adequate land supply and the provision of an efficient 
supporting infrastructure. 
   (HKHA, 2002) 
 
Therefore, the production and sale of HOS and PSPS were stopped immediately. The sale of 
public rental housing flats under TPS after Phase 6 was also stopped.  
 
Until now, there is no major change in the direction of developing public housing. In the 
Budget in 2010 to 2011, the Financial Secretary reaffirms the role of public rental house again 
and reiterates not to reinstate the TPS and HOS. Therefore, the Government will only work on 
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the public rental housing for the needy but not anything related to home ownership in public 
housing 
 
1.2. Scope of Study 
 
As the main focus of this dissertation is causes of conflicts in the TPS, different scopes of 
study will be involved in the investigation. Firstly, building management is one of the largest 
topics to be studies. It involves many specific subjects in it. In this dissertation, the study is 
confined to the property owning democracies in Owners’ Corporation and the share of 
management responsibility for common area between owners with provision of the DMC. 
 
Moreover, in the process of examination the propositions, large amount of theories and 
evidence are needed. Therefore, concept of privatization, mixed tenure and home ownership 
will be studied. Behavioral economics will also be study so as to understand the rationale for 
causing conflict of human being. 
 
 
1.3. Importance of the Study 
 
Throughout the TPS, there are total 39 PRH estates being privatized. The average age of the 
estate is 10 with the reason of good condition in structure but not too new to affect the private 
property market. After more than 10 years time to 2010, most of the TPS estates have become 
over 20 years old. Maintenance becomes a large and unavoidable issue for the TPS estates. In 
additional, the structure guarantee of more than half of the TPS estates had expired. All of the 
maintenance fee will be transfer to the owners which will be managed by OC. Moreover, the 
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number of conflicts occurred in the TPS estates increased obviously in the recent years. It is 
so clear that the problem is getting worse. It is important to find the causes of those conflicts 
so as to improve the management system in the TPS estates.  
 
On the other hand, the real estate market trend starts to bloom. Many parties claim it is so 
hard to buy their own property. Some political parties and pressure groups request the 
government resume the TPS and Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) in order to release the 
bloom of the market. However, the response of government is pessimistic. It reaffirms the 
neutral role of government in the real estate market. No matter what the result is in the future. 
The result of this dissertation is important for considering the management system if TPS is 
reinstated. 
 
 
1.4. Structure of the Study 
 
There are six chapters in this dissertation. 
 
This chapter is an introductory chapter which explains rationales of this research, the 
background information of the study, the scope of the study and the importance of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 is a theoretical review on the concepts of privatization, home ownership and mixed 
tenure in one estate. Moreover, behavioral economics will also be studied. Also, the 
uniqueness of the co-ownership system in Hong Kong is being studies which included the 
theoretical structure of institutional arrangement in a multi-ownership building. The rationale 
and the legal framework of the DMC will be studied. Finally, the objectives and propositions 
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of this dissertation will be stated. 
 
 
Chapter 3 is the introduction of the methodology used in this dissertation. As propositions are 
stated, evidence should be found in order to examine them. Therefore, the type of evidence 
used will be explained. Furthermore, the method in collecting those evidence and data will be 
illustrated. 
 
Chapter 4 is the chapter for examining the propositions of this dissertation by using the 
evidence and data found. Some facts of the DMC and management structure in the TPS will 
be explained first. Then, case study will be carried out in order to support the propositions. 
 
Chapter 5 is the final chapter of this dissertation. It includes the summary of the study which 
explains the founding of this research. Also, limitations of the study and further research area 
will also be explained. 
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Chapter 2       Theoretical Review 
 
The objectives of this chapter are firstly to review generally privatization theory and concepts 
and how these have been seen to apply to housing; and then consider how privatization of 
housing in Hong Kong has developed.  Therefore, this chapter is divided into six main 
sections. The first one is the theoretical review in the key areas in this dissertation 
accompanying reviews on literatures in different places around the world. Secondly, a deep 
investigation of the housing policy in Hong Kong will be done based on the findings in the 
previous part. In the third part, a number of behavioral economics theories will be used to 
apply on the situation in TPS so as to predict those possible conflicts made under TPS. Finally, 
propositions of this dissertation are going to be made based on the analysis of the previous 
part.  
 
 
2.1 Privatization  
 
Over several decades’ discussions and debates, there are many definitions of privatization in 
various aspects in the society, for instance, economics, political, social, etc. They may share 
nearly the same idea, however, most of them have their own prospective towards definition. 
In order to evaluate the policy of privatization of public housing in Hong Kong, a clear idea 
and picture will be portrayed in this part. 
 
 
Definition of Privatization 
The literature of privatization has been sprouting in recent decades. It also becomes a very 
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controversial topic in the world and one of the most vital themes in many government policies. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to have a common understanding on the exact definition of 
privatization (Poon, 2004). It is supported by Starr who attests that privatization is a very 
vague concept and thus difficult to define (Starr, 1989).  
In Britain, since Thatcher Government took over the rule in 1979, she started the sale State 
Owned Enterprises and contracting out. Such kind of transfer of assets or services delivery 
from the government sector to private services provider was first viewed as “Privatization”. 
Etymologically, the term privatization implies withdrawal of the state from the production of 
goods and services or transfer of ownership from the public sector to private sector (Webster, 
1983) 
 
Privatization has assumed a very elastic definition and is coming to mean all things to all 
people as it is adopted in a wide range of countries to cover a great variety of changes in 
economies and social policy (Clarke, 1994). According to Hanke’s idea, the definition of 
privatization can be divided into narrow and board sense. For the former, privatization can be 
defined as the transfer of those state-owned enterprises from public to private sector. On the 
other hand, for the latter, privatization can be regarded as an enhancement of overall 
efficiency, effectiveness and versatility through the competitive market mechanism with the 
shedding-off the government responsibilities from both goods and services provisions (Hanke, 
1985). In general, it means the rolling back of state intervention in the welfare area and the 
reduction of state provision or subsidy as well as deregulation of state control (Grand & 
Robinson, 1984). 
 
From the political point of view, privatization is a process of utilizing private services 
currently provided by various levels of government and may be seen as a decrement 
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adjustment in the state role (Hays, 1994). Bos even said privatization is the reverse of 
nationalization (Bos, 1990). Then, privatization was regarded as denationalization which 
means a situation where at least 50% of the shares of the company are sold to private 
shareholders (Beesley, 1983). In history, Britain and France are the pioneers in the wave of 
privatization (Bos, 1990) 
 
From the social point of view, privatization means the responsibility in social services 
provision shifted totally or partially to the private sectors (Walker, 1984). He also remarked 
that privatization is an attempt to differentiate between public and private sources as well as a 
mean to strike a new balance between them. 
 
It is undoubted that it is not easy to digest all the definitions as they are diversified on 
different aspects. Nevertheless, there is a relatively comprehensive definition concluded by Li. 
Privatization is a general term describing a multitude of government initiatives designed to 
increase the role of the private sector in the provision of the conventional public sector. The 
principle behind privatization represents an ideology that puts larger emphasis on the 
efficiency of the market forces than to change the public administrative structure to improve 
the efficiency of the public sector service (Li, 2000).  
 
 
 
Rationale of Privatization 
Besides the definition, the rationale behind privatization is also a key issue for us to 
understand more about privatization of public housing. The rationale can be easily understood 
compared to the definition as the reasons of privatization are likely the same round the world. 
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The rationale for privatization is broadly represented by market imperfections and promoting 
competition; the social costs of private sector, the long-term ownership benefits of the states 
and the costs and inadequacies of the regulatory framework (Ramanadham 1987). In simple 
words, the rationale of privatization is private sector can do better than the government. 
 
On the other hand, there are several assumptions underlying privatization. At the heart of the 
privatization strategy, there is an assumption that the public sector is wasteful, inefficient and 
non-productive (Walker, 1984). For the first one, there is a brief that public services stifle 
individual initiative and responsibility. Second, private sector is necessarily more efficient 
than the public sector. Finally, the non-productive public sector is costly burden on the 
productive private sector as increase in public expenditure means more public fund needed to 
finance them. 
 
The rationale of privatization is supported by Kent with four ideas (Kent, 1987): 
(1) One must pay full cost for the public goods and services; 
(2) competition amongst private sector will undoubtedly acquire efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness; 
(3) a variety of options can freely selected from the private market; and 
(4) New services and technologies can be freely invented. 
 
 
 
Objectives of Privatization 
In this part, objectives of privatization will be clarified. It is because there are plenty of 
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objectives which proposed by different scholars.  
The objectives of privatization are proposed by Vickers and Yarrow: 
(1) Reducing government involvement in industry 
(2) Improving efficiency in the industries privatized 
(3) Reducing the public sector borrowing requirement 
(4) Easing problems of pay determination by weakening the public sector unions 
(5) Widening share ownership 
(6) Encourage employee share ownership 
(7) Gaining political advantage 
 
These are seven objectives which cover all aspects including economies, social and political. 
There are also some objectives which are focus on a definite aspect. The World Bank Policy 
Paper of 1992 stated that privatization is also providing with 3 broad objectives (Poon, 2004): 
(1) To increase economic efficiency at the level of industrial firms and market; 
(2) To raise revenue for government activities; and 
(3) To promote distributional and political ends (Linneman & Megbolugbe, 1994) 
 
The above objectives are general for the privatization concept. The main idea is to reduce the 
burden of the government and open the market for private competition in order to improve the 
quality of the services. Therefore, these may not be all suitable for privatization of public 
housing which is the key issue of this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is vital to understand the 
fundamental concept first. The detail of the privatization of public housing will be discussed 
in the next part. 
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Different forms of Privatization 
After talking about the conceptual idea of privatization, in this part, some practical forms of 
privatization will be discussed. There are different methods in carrying out privatization but 
achieving the above objectives.  
Privatization policy is not a short-term government policy, oppositely, it is a relatively 
long-term process. Thus, the type of privatization to be implemented is playing a pivot role 
for the stability of the society and the effective operation of government. The choice of 
privatization methods will be determined partly on grounds of their effectiveness in meeting 
the objectives of the programme, but also by the practical constraints that may limit the 
choice of privatization method that can be employed (Poon, 2004). Many scholars have their 
own classification on different forms of privatization. 
 
Forest and Murie classified privatization activities into four main groups. They are 
denationalization, substitution, liberalization and contracting out (Forest and Murie, 1988). 
On the other hand, Kent stated that there are also four types of privatization including sale of 
government enterprises to private organizations, contracting out a private organization, 
charging user fees to recover cost of public services provided and providing vouchers to low 
income families to buy goods or services from private sector (Kent, 1987). 
 
In concluding the different classification, public enterprises/ services can be privatized in 
various ways that can be mainly grouped into four categories. They are sales arrangement, 
contracting arrangement, deregulation and user pay. 
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Sales arrangement 
It means the ownership is transferred from government to private enterprises. Moreover, the 
status of the employees turns from civil servants to private employees. There are three types 
of sales arrangement which are public flotation, private sale and management buy-out.  
Public flotation is a method that selling the equity of the public enterprises to the general 
public through the formal stock market. The sale may be complete, where all the equity is 
sold, or partial, where government retains a proportion of the equity (Parry, 1990). 
Private sale involve the sale of all or part of the shares in public enterprise to a single 
purchaser or a group of purchasers (Parry, 1990). Private sales can be negotiated by 
competitive bidding or by negotiation with potential purchasers (Poon, 2004). The last one is 
management buy-out. It means the managers of the enterprise acquiring controlling shares in 
the enterprise. It rarely happens in Hong Kong’s public enterprise but it is a problem in 
mainland China. 
 
Contracting arrangement 
It involves the transfer of the production of services previously performed by in-house 
government to private contractors. There are mainly three types of contracting arrangement. 
They are contracting out, management contract and leasing arrangement.  
Contracting out means that private sector contractors provide a specified level and quality of 
public services under a legal contract made between the government and the contractors. The 
service to be provided has to be specified in the contract and has to be monitored during the 
contract period (John, 1989). Management contract involves contracting out the management 
of the enterprise for a given period of time to a private company. The last one is leasing 
arrangement which is seldom used. A private operator leases assets, facilities or a brand name 
owned by the government and uses them to conduct business on its own account (Poon, 
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2004). 
 
Deregulation 
Governments in different countries will provide various services for the society. Some of 
them are monopoly services where private sector is not involved due to some regulations set 
by government. Deregulation refers to the reduction of state regulation that is accomplished 
by removing restrictions on market entry. Thus, private sector can take part in those services. 
 
User pay 
The government retreats from funding and delivery of public services have created a new 
regime, where services once universally funded by taxes and other public revenues are no 
longer low-cost or fee (Roger, 1991). In this way, some services provided by the government 
are not support by tax, but the users of those services. 
 
 
 
Privatization of Public Housing 
Privatization of public housing is one of the most significant international trends in housing 
provision. The most popular conception of privatization of housing is that sale of public 
dwellings to the sitting tenants. There are a lot of examples around the world. In 1987, a 
limited ‘right to buy’ policy was introduced in the Housing and Community Development Act 
in the United States which permitted successful resident management corporations to 
purchase homes after three years, under the Reagan administration, new public housing 
started fell from more than 45000 to 7000 units per year. Public rent was raised to 30% of 
tenant income (Silver, 1990). Moreover, in 1994, Britain had sold about one third of its public 
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rental housing and introduced important measures to commodity, commercialize and 
marketize its public rental stock, including privatization of management and housing renewal 
(Forrest, 1990). 
 
United Kingdom has a very long history in providing social housing. She is also the first 
country to start privatize her social rental housing. Therefore, some UK experience will be 
study in this part in order to understand the practice of privatization of public housing in the 
world. Privatization in British is motivated by political as well as economic reasons (Yu, 
1998). There are many different forms of privatization of housing, for instance, asset sales, 
deregulation and contracting out. An example of privatizing public housing in UK was the 
1980 Housing Act initiated by the Thatcher Government introducing a statutory right-to-buy 
for council tenants to boost the home ownership (Wu, 2009). After enforcing the right-to-buy 
option in the sale of local authority house to sitting tenants, the government sought to get rid 
of the state as a big landlord and to bring housing back to the community (Yu, 1998). Right to 
Buy is regarded as a successful scheme in privatization of public housing policy, even though 
some economics impacts were generated. However, it is welcomed by most of the people in 
UK since social aspect and neighborhood are improved. 
 
 
2.2 Home Ownership 
 
The major purpose of this part is to study the nature of home ownership theoretically. By 
making reviews on the theories of home ownership, it can make better understanding on why 
governments want to increase the rate of ownership. On the other hand, more importantly, the 
reasons for people desiring a home ownership can also be clarified. This part is pivotal to be a 
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theoretical framework for developing the propositions at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
 
Definition of Home Ownership 
The notion of home ownership has always been a battlefield among different intellectuals, 
mostly in the English-speaking world who have varied and diverse opinions (Chan, 1995). 
Therefore, the main purpose of this part is to describe the concept of home ownership 
comprehensively. 
 
Home ownership can be referred to a concept of great complexity on many different levels. In 
term of status, legal rights and investment, home ownership is considered as significant 
advantages over cost renting (Doling, 1997). The word “different levels” means that there are 
various kinds of tenure. This classification concept was developed by Rex and Moore. We can 
identify a hierarchy of housing classes ranging from owner occupiers to private tenant, the 
important being that these divisions cut across those arising from the world of works (Rex and 
Moore, 1967). Furthermore, they remarked that geographical district and areas should be 
taken into account for the above statement. It is a social inequality on the housing advantage. 
It is doubtless that there is large difference in class perception between people owning a float 
in Yuen Long and at the Peak on Hong Kong Island with excellent sea view. 
 
 
 
Debates on Home Ownership 
Ownership is regarded as one of the many kinds of tenures. Therefore, the next question is 
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why I should choose ownership for living place. In nowadays society, especially in Hong 
Kong, the ultimate goal of many people is to own their own shelter. However, there is a big 
debate on this question between different scholars. 
 
Ownership is not a prerequisite to a good life (Kemeny, 1981). He argued that renting is more 
beneficial to the average citizen. Kemeny’s thinking may refer to Engels’ work. Shackled to 
their homes, burdened with heavy debts, they had no choice but to accept the working 
conditions they were offered (Engels, 1975). It means home ownership exploits the working 
class since workers would be tied more firmly to a particular employer. Therefore, home 
ownership makes worker even more dependent on their employer. 
 
Also, a number of scholars argue that owners cannot gain any advantage through ownership. 
The one who have the best of it is the one who produce the house. Housing development and 
the overall distribution of tenure are seen as social processes dominated by those who produce 
the houses (Ball, 1983). The housing production system reflects strong control by the 
developers and those who are intimately involved in the exchange process of housing 
resources. 
 
From the social point of view, home ownership is a fragmentation and segmentation social 
process (Forrest & Murie, 1989). Forrest (1990) remarked that as home ownership expands, 
the market is becoming more stratified and more segmented. It means there is a large group of 
low-income owners who derive few material advantages from the purchase of a house and 
may be relatively disadvantaged when compared with some public tenants.  
 
Moreover, ownership is just a tenure of all different kinds of housing tenures. The most 
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important point is that it may not be the best one. However, people always have an innate 
desire for home ownership. It is an ontological preference for ownership. It is not a rational 
economic trade-off of costs and benefits available from functional substitutes (La Grange, 
2002). Saunders also proposed that the families have an innate desire for the ontological 
security that owner occupation provides. It is a concept that transcends affordability 
constraints or policy induced tenure decisions. Therefore, home ownership may not help in 
the economics of the whole society. For example, a very wealthy country like Switzerland has 
a lower rate of home ownership than a very poor country like Bangladesh (La Grange, 2002). 
Thus, the explanation of home ownership as tenure preference is complex. 
 
It seems that ownership is not that beneficial to the society. Nevertheless, home ownership 
has become a powerful economics and cultural symbol in many societies, with a profound 
influence on policy outcomes (Hays, 1993). Also, housing consumption is an important part 
of overall consumption of the society (Saunders, 1978). It plays a significant role in the 
development of any society and is of the utmost important for social, economic and cultural 
progress in most nations. Owner-occupation is thus seen as a reflection of the wealth of those 
social groups who can afford home ownership. 
 
Although the picture is described quite clear now on the economic and social sides, it is not a 
full picture. If ownership is not the best among the tenure choices, what are the reasons for 
explaining the rising ownership rate over the world? It is because we have not considered the 
personal consideration yet. Therefore, some norms and psychological considerations of 
human being are going to be discussed. 
 
Our home is our shelter. Nonetheless, in reality, it is much more than that. It is material and 
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psychological well being (Hays, 1993). The latter includes privacy, tastes, personal status and 
a place separated from the outside world. It is supported by Yip. He said that the idea of home 
ownership is closely associated with notions of privacy, freedom, independence and 
autonomy (Yip, 2002). Therefore, due to the influence of psychological of human being in 
home ownership, this consideration will be divided into four parts and will be discussed one 
by one.  
 
Sense of belonging 
For owners, a home is a place of permanent and personal security, a place of freedom and 
autonomy and is linked to the intimate family ties, which distinguishes home from mere 
housing (Chan, 1998). Saunders’ survey in Britain supported the above ideas. Most 
respondents expressed their grievances against the autonomy of how to decorate and the 
choice of location of residence but they thought that home owning could compensate this 
deficiency. It is not difficult to understand Saunders’ idea. Even your home is located at 
Lantua Island, you will think that it is my home. You will not that mind the location compared 
to renting it. It may sum up that “home” is a key unit of production as well as of consumption.  
It is a place where various forms of work get done, but it is also a place where we may expect 
to experience a sense of personal autonomy and freedom (Saunders, 1990) 
 
Pride and identity 
Just like what mentioned in the last two paragraphs, home ownership has been strongly linked 
to the psychological well being. The element of pride could be acquired from the social status 
attached to the house and its neighborhood and capitalist societies (Chan, 1998). This idea 
was supported by McLaverty and Yip. They suggested that tenure references may well reflect 
people’s past, current and expected housing experiences (McLaverty and Yip, 1993). 
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Therefore, it can be concluded by making use of Agnew’s idea. To own a house, on top of 
having a property in hand, becomes a good indicator of status and identify and “obtained the 
social esteem and freedom from landlords that renters cannot acquire” (Agnew, 1982) 
 
Natural instincts 
Home ownership is inherently desirable and naturally superior to other forms of tenure. It has 
become a norm for people to think of buying rather than renting flats. Thus home ownership 
is a desire in some way the expression of a natural inclination of instinct. It is supported by 
Margaret Thatcher, a former Prime Minister of England. He said that the desire to have and to 
hold something of one’s own is basic to the spirit of man. So many people own their homes 
and so many others would like to, we tend to assume that such a desire is in some way the 
expression of a natural inclination or instinct to satisfy some deep desire in their hearts. 
Saunders used some simple wording to express the relationship between natural instinct and 
home ownership.  
 
Ontological security 
Ontological security is a stable mental state derived from a sense of continuity in regard to the 
events in one’s life (Giddens, 1991). In home ownership, Western societies mostly English 
speaking countries regard that home ownership provides a kind of security feeling, which 
goes beyond mere property values. It is supported by Forrest that home owners are more 
readily associated positive image of life with the house they live in. Home ownership does 
contribute to a sense of ontological security (Forrest, 1990). Moreover, ontological security 
can be attained more through owner occupied than rented housing. 
 
After an all rounded debate on the concept of home ownership, it is actually related to society, 
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economy, psychology and instincts. It can be summed up by quoting a paragraph from the 
British Government White Paper in housing. 
 
“Home ownership is the most rewarding form of housing tenure. It satisfies a 
deep and nature desire on the part of the householder to have independent 
control of the home that shelters him and his family. It gives him the greatest 
possible security against the loss of his home; and particularly against price 
changes that may threaten his ability to keep it. If the householder buys his 
house on mortgage, he builds up by steady saving a capital asset for himself 
and his dependents.” 
 
 
 
2.3 Mixed Tenure  
 
The term “mixed tenure” is widely used in many areas, for example, land use. However, in 
this dissertation, we will just focus on the area of housing. Although the focus is made to be 
more concentrated, it is a complicated topic to study because of the specifications of different 
place around the world. Therefore, in this part, the concept of “mixed tenure” as well as its 
application will be introduced. It is important to understand more about this concept in order 
to compare with Hong Kong’s system. 
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Definition of mixed tenure 
As we all know that there are many different kinds of tenures. In general, the definition of 
mixed tenure is an estate with more than one type of tenures which is also called tenure 
diversification. In my opinion, I think mixed tenure is a term used to describe the situation of 
tenure of a particular estate. On the other hand, tenure diversification is an action to make 
different kind of tenures of a particular estate. Mixed tenure is a result of tenure 
diversification. 
 
However, there are various approaches to mixed tenure in different places around the world. 
Therefore, some practices of other countries will be introduced in order to understand more 
about mixed tenure. 
 
In England, tenure mix has been one of the central tools used by the Government in the 
attempt to deliver social and income mix (Rowlands, 2006). This trend in England was started 
in 1980s. Mixed tenure policy in the England appeared to develop in the late 1980s, after a 
period from 1979 to 1988, when a substantial set of policy tools focused on tenure mixing or 
“diversification” in local authority estate (Tunstall, 2003). The original starter was the Right 
to Buy Scheme.   
 
“The Right to Buy Scheme is aimed at secure tenants of local authorities and of 
registered social landlords/ housing associations and at those assured tenants of 
registered social landlords/ housing association who previously held secure tenancies 
with local authorities. It is open to virtually any secure tenants who can afford to buy.” 
( Dept. for Communities and Local Government) 
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In simple wording, the Right to Buy Scheme is a policy in the United Kingdom which gives 
tenants of council housing the right to buy the home they are living in. There is also a Right to 
Acquire Scheme for the tenants of housing associations currently. Between 1980 and 1998, it 
is estimated that approximately 2 million homes in the UK were sold in this manner. The 
effect of these policies was to create new mixed tenure neighborhoods within council estate 
(Forrest and Murie, 1991). It leads to a current debate that mixed tenure has assumed that 
developments will consist of market housing and housing for social rent (Rowlands, 2006). 
Similar policy was also implemented in Ireland which was called Affordable Housing Scheme. 
It is a scheme in Ireland that aims to help lower income households to buy their own home. 
 
On the other hand, mixed tenure is regarded as a planning to develop mixed neighborhood. 
The main difference of the previous type of mixed tenure is that it is planned originally to 
develop a mixed tenure estate. All the houses are newly built. There has been strong support 
in government for mixing tenure on newly housing estates in UK. Underpinning this is a 
notion that tenure mix will provide a mix of households with different incomes and a social 
mix (Rowlands, 2006). However, it has remained unclear what is being delivered and whether 
mixing of tenure is an effective means of securing social. Nevertheless, it is just one of the 
mixed tenure methods but not the main focus of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
Rationales of mixed tenure  
Support for mixed tenure has become so widespread and unquestioning that rationales are not 
always explicit and can be somewhat intangible (Tunstall, 2003). For example, the 
Department of Environment in UK stated that tenure diversification in council helps create a 
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new atmosphere and attitude. Tunstall remarked that many claims for the benefits of mixed 
tenure include more or less explicit references to beneficial neighborhood effects of mixed 
tenure areas and tenure mixing process. It is also supported by UK think tank and 
commentators (Jupp, 1999). Furthermore, mixed tenure is now a widely accepted policy 
designed to tackle problems of social exclusion in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Graham, 
2007). Especially for the mixed tenure policies in UK, they have a very details plan for 
developing a mixed tenure estate as precise as the proportion of tenure in that estate. For 
instance, they found that the proportion of owner-occupied and social renting should be 66% 
to 33% which is better than 50% to 50%. Some studies have also suggested that mixed tenure 
scheme can reduce perceptions and the fear of anti-social behavior (Beekman, 2001). It seems 
quite confused that the rationale of mixed tenure is just to improve the neighborhood of the 
community. Fortunately, Bailey drew a comprehensive conclusion on this topic. There are 
many motivations underpinning the commitment to mixed tenure estate. These may represent 
“universal principles”, or can be practical approaches which are supported by experience “on 
the ground” (Bailey, 2007). He listed 7 advantages for mixed tenure estate. 
(1) To counter adverse neighborhood effects and promote the improved provision of facilities 
and integrated services; 
(2) To promote social cohesion, reduce social exclusion and create stronger communities; 
(3) To assist families with children to play a full part in building inclusive communities; 
(4) To encourage developers and others to provide the full range of house sizes, types and 
tenures; 
(5) To enable residents to access a variety of training and employment opportunities; 
(6) To provide good quality amenities and facilities; 
(7) To increase “liveability” through high quality design, and facilitate innovative and 
responsive systems of management. (Bailey, 2007) 
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The above researches can show us that mixed tenure policies do have advantages for both 
owner and renter in the estate. However, these researches only focus on the newly built mixed 
tenure estate with well planning. There are few literature investigating the problems of those 
mixed tenure estate which is formed due to privatization programme, for example, Right to 
Buy Scheme in UK. 
 
 
2.4 Behavioral Economics  
 
Behavioral economics is a branch of economics for understanding the decisions of human 
beings. It is built on a foundation of behavioral science (Schmid, 2004). Behavioral 
economics was also used to explain the conflicts in an institution. In this dissertation, the 
theories in the behavioral economics will be used to set up the proposition of this dissertation. 
 
Motivation and complete contract 
Every individual has their own private interests which are rarely exactly the same with the 
interests of other individual in a group or in the whole society (Milgrom, 1992). Inside the 
behavioral economic, the theories are based on the assumption that people will do only what 
they perceive to be in their own individual interests.  
 
Motivation is a vital consideration in an institution which should ensure the individuals in the 
organization are doing what they are willing to do in order to maximizing the output. 
However, due to the selfish behavioral of human being, people will do what they want to 
which may affect others. Thus, conflicts arise. Therefore, an agreement has to be made in 
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order to recognize their mutual interests and agree to modify their behavior in ways that are 
mutually beneficial (Milgrom, 1992). This kind of agreement is called a contract. John Robert 
added that a contract may encompass the sort of actions each party is to take, any payments 
that might flow from one to other, the rules and procedures they will use to decide matters in 
the future, and the behavior that each might expect from one another (Robert, 1992). 
 
Therefore, a complete contract is effective and important for controlling individuals’ 
motivation problem. If no motivation problem arises in an agreement, it is called a complete 
contract. A complete contract can precisely specify what each party is to do in every possible 
circumstance and arrange the distribution of realized costs and benefits in each contingency 
(Milgrom, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
Bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior 
Many people may ask why conflicts still exist if a compete contract exist. It is a good 
question but I am sorry to tell you that no prefect contract exists in the reality. A complete 
contract is just a theory in economic books since there are plenty of difficulties in making a 
prefect contract, for example, limited foresight, imprecise language, the costs of calculating 
solutions and the costs of writing a detailed contract. These kinds of limited ability are called 
bounded rationality. Real people are not omniscient nor perfectly far-sighted. They cannot 
solve arbitrarily complex problems exactly, costlessly and instantaneously and unable to 
communicate with one another freely and perfectly (Milgrom, 1992). Therefore, all people are 
bounded rational. An actual contract cannot tackle all the contingencies in the real world. As a 
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result, the parties may do something that favor for themselves as the contingency is not bound 
in the contract. It is called opportunistic behavior. In simple wording, due to bounded 
rationality of human being, a prefect contract could not be drawn. Then, incomplete contract 
will cause opportunistic behavior if contingencies happen. To conclude, the more effort we 
put on preventing opportunistic behavior, high cost should be put on writing the contract 
because of bounded rationality of people. This cost is called transaction cost.  
 
Therefore, transaction cost, bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior are the very 
pivotal concept in the behavioral economics of organization. It can be concluded by using a 
sentence written by Oliver Williamson. 
 
“Any attempt to deal seriously with the study of economic organization must come to 
terms with the combined ramifications of bounded rationality and opportunism.” 
(Williamson, 1985) 
 
 
 
Consequences of Incomplete contract 
Because of the incompleteness of the contract, it may cause less effectiveness in enforcing the 
contract.  Therefore, the effects of contractual incompleteness will be investigated.  
 
Due to the opportunism, people will fight for their maximum benefit where some 
circumstances occurs which are not covered by the contract. As a result, conflict will arise at 
this case. Conflicts have to be settled by reaching a mutual agreement of both parties. 
Transaction costs are involved in this process. Therefore, it causes inefficiency. 
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The most direct one is that either party wants to renege the deal.  That means parties will not 
do what the contract require them to do because the cost of completing the contract are higher 
than reneging. It is a common phenomenon in the trading. If a unforeseeable contingencies 
take place which make the cost for carrying out the contract high, one of the party will 
terminate the contract because the compensation cost is lower than the cost for continuous the 
trading.  
 
In some situation, it may not a good idea to terminate the contract even there are 
incompleteness in the contract. For example, some details may be missed in the original 
negotiation which can maximize their profit of both parties.  In this case, it will be 
advantageous for both parties to renegotiate the contract ex post. Therefore, renegotiation is a 
consequence of incomplete contract. Although the result of the renegotiation will have a 
better result, the costs for rewriting the contract is still high 
 
 
 
Group Decision Making 
In nowadays society, it is difficult to make a decision individually. Most of the time is group 
decision, for example, family, company, etc. Deciding a place to hold a gathering with friend 
is also a group decision. Therefore, group decision is a fascinating topic to be discussed.  
 
Nearly every decision is made after achieving some level of agreement or consensus among 
group member. Different group will have different level of consensus which is called group’s 
decision rule (Norman, 1992). These decision rules may be explicit and formal or implicit and 
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informal. For decision procedure, there are mainly two procedures. Firstly, the voting rules 
which just vote for your favorite choice which is commonly used in many group decision 
making. Second one is the group’s formal agenda which sometimes the order in which issues 
are taken up affect the decisions reached (Robert S., 1992) 
 
“Group decision making can be viewed as a process whereby groups move from initial 
disagreement to a sufficient level of agreement to satisfy some decision rule.” (Robert S. 
1992) 
 
From the idea of Robert, we could know that it is impossible to achieve a group decision 
where the entire members in the group agree. On the other hand, the decision made is just a 
decision that agreed by a sufficient portion of member according to the decision rule. It is not 
difficult to understand. In many group decisions, minority have to follow the idea of the 
majority, for instance, voting. Even the decision is a compromise of the group members, there 
are still some member do not totally agree with the decision.  
 
2.5 Privatization of Housing in Hong Kong 
 
In this part, the focus will be put on the situation of privatization of Hong Kong Public 
Housing by comparing the above theories reviewed. First of all, the background of the Hong 
Kong public housing system will be gone through in order to understand the rationales for 
implementing the TPS. Secondly, the details of the TPS will be listed with analysis of 
different literature, for instance, the co-ownership operation, mixed tenure management, etc. 
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From the previous part, we know that the Government had been started to provide affordable 
housing ownership to low-income family in Hong Kong in 1984. It is Home Ownership 
Scheme. After HOS, there were a number of different kinds of schemes for encouraging 
ownership provided by the Government which could be classified into three categories.  
Policies for increasing ownership in Hong Kong 
 
Selling flats built by the Government 
 
(1) Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) 
With the aim of providing 1.8 million people with permanent self-contained homes and 
the fast increase in household income, the Government started the HOS so as to assist this 
lower-middle income group who were not eligible for PRH units but were not affordable 
for private housing in 1976. 
 
Over more than 30 years, HOS is regarded as a successful scheme for raising the home 
ownership in Hong Kong. Although HOS was terminated in 2002, more than 300,000 
families are living in HOS.  
 
(2) Sandwich Class Housing Scheme (SCHS) 
The definition of the word “Sandwich Class” means people who are not eligible for PRH, 
HOS and private housing. In simple wording, they are not eligible for HOS but they are 
not rich enough to buy private housing. The government appointed the HKHS to carry out 
the SCHS in 1993 in order to provide housing for sandwich class. The main task was to 
provide 30,000 units at a discount of 70% of market price by 2003. SCHS was stopped in 
1998 due to the Asian Financial Crisis. This scheme had benefited for more than 5,700 
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families and the last phase of selling had been taken place in 2010. 
 
 
Assisting people to buy flat in private sector 
 
(1) Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) 
HPLS is a policy introduced in 1988. The main content is to provide alternative for 
low-income family to purchase their own dwelling by giving out an interest-free loan for 
covering the downpayment loan. It is not difficult to figure out the rationales behind. It was a 
dual strategy of utilizing the surplus production of the private developers and satisfying the 
demand for assisted housing (Chiu, 1997). 
 
One of the target types was the public rental housing tenants. This scheme encouraged them 
to move to private housing. It is also the first scheme to help public rental housing tenants to 
buy private housing.  
 
(2) Home Starter Loan Scheme (HSLS) 
This scheme was introduced in 1998 to provide low interest loans to eligible first time home 
buyers from low to middle income families with household income not exceeding $70,000 
per month and who were unable to afford their own flat in private property market (HKSAR 
government, 1998). The limit of the household income was adjusted from $70,000 per month 
to $50,000 per month.  
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Privatization 
 
(1) Sale of Flats to Sitting Tenants Scheme (SFSTS) 
It is the first privatization in public rental housing under HKHA. It was introduced in 1991. 
Eleven blocks of public rental housing within 5 years of age were elected for sale to the 
sitting tenants. Due to the high selling price for poor quality flats, this scheme was a failure 
and terminated after the first sale. Nevertheless, the Government never stopped there. HKHA 
tried to propose the second trial on SFSTS. However, it was banned by the Executive Council. 
 
(2) Tenant Purchase Scheme (TPS) 
Although the SFSTS could not complete the task of privatization of public rental housing, the 
Government had never forgiven to sell them. There was a chance again after the handover of 
sovereignty of Hong Kong. In order to stabilize the society, the HKSAR government started 
to push up the ownership rate again because ownership is a mean to stabilize the community.  
 
A scheme for public housing units was announced in 1998 which is called Tenants Purchase 
Scheme. After the failure of SFSTS, TPS had a large improvement and became more 
attractive since HKHA reduced the discount further which was around 70% discount of 
market price. As a result, 39 public housing estates of HKHA were sold in the period from 
1998 to 2005. TPS was terminated in 2002 due the relocation of the role of the government in 
real estate market. 
 
 
Details of Tenants Purchase Scheme estates 
Since TPS is the key research area of this dissertation, more words will be used to describe on 
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this policy in order to understand completely its implementation and operation. As TPS had 
already terminated, the effect bought by TPS on property market and the evaluation of the 
efficiency of TPS will not be our main concern in this dissertation even though numerous 
research had been done on these aspects. Moreover, the trend of public housing is relatively 
clear in the future where the chance for privatization the public housing again is small. 
Therefore, the focus will be put on the causes of the management problem in the estates 
which are under TPS. Thus, operation system of TPS has to be studied in order to discover the 
causes of the problem. The operation system in this dissertation is defined as the daily 
management operation and the mechanism in decision making within the estate. 
 
 
 
Features of the operation system 
Before the implementation of the TPS, the operation of public rental housing was simple. 
Traditionally, there were only two parties in the system. The first one was the tenants. The 
second one was the HKHA. The HKHA acted as the sole owner of the estate and rent the unit 
out for the low-income family. All the facilities and property management were done by 
HKHA. There was an extra body called Mutual Aid Committee (MAC) organized by tenants 
which is authorized by Home Affair Department (HAD). The reason for setting MAC is to 
reflect the opinions of tenants to HA and coordinate the tenants in the estate. HA started to 
contract out the property management services of public rental housing estates to Property 
Management Agents (PMAs) since the 1990s. The details of this policy could refer to the 
related journal since it did not cause changes in the structure of the operation system. The 
organizational structure of the operation system can refer to the diagram 2.1. 
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Diagram 2.1 Organizational Structure of Public Rental Housing Estate. 
 
After the implementation of TPS, the above structure was totally changed. The privatized 
public rental estate was regarded as a private housing estate. According the Building 
Management Ordinance (Cap.344) (BMO), OC must be set up by following the instructions 
of DMC. Therefore, the tenants who bought their sitting units became owners. In this 
situation, HA was not the sole owner any more. The estate was owned by those owners and 
HA. In the first two years, HA acted as an assistant in developing a formal private estate for 
TPS estates. Property Management Unit (PMU) of Housing Department was assigned to 
assist the owners to set up the OC. Moreover, PMU also took the responsibility of 
management arrangement until OC was formed which the owner can choose to employ a 
PMA or not. For those tenants who did not buy their sitting units, they are still tenants of HA. 
The issue of Tenants will be handled by the Tenancy Management Unit (TMU), for instance, 
enforcement of HA policies and rest chasing. 
 In the operation side, all the decisions were made by the OC.  Although HA is the biggest 
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owner, HA always keep its stand neutral in the OC meeting due to political consideration. On 
the other, all the expense on the common area of the estate will be paid by individual owner 
and HA according to the proportion of the owning in the estate. On the other hand, MAC had 
no authority in the TPS. Thus, MAC became a voluntary body in the estate. The below 
diagram can clearly show the new organizational structure under TPS. 
     
Diagram 2.2 Organizational Structure of TPS Estates 
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Furthermore, table 2.1 shows the authorities of different bodies in the operation system before 
and after the implementation of TPS. 
 
Before After 
HA 
• The sole owner 
• Responsible for all management 
before outsourcing 
 
• The biggest co-owner 
• Responsible for the request from tenants 
• Sending one representative to OC but 
neutral stand 
Tenants 
• The only tenants 
• Directly express opinion to the top of 
the organization (HA) 
• Mixed tenure: tenants and owners 
• Cannot express opinion to the top of the 
organization (OC) 
Owners 
• Same as Tenants 
 
• Can direct manage the estate by taking part 
in the OC 
• Share the management fee with HA 
OC 
N/A • Authorized body in managing the building 
and estate. 
• Formed by all owners according to DMC  
PMA 
• The client is HA • The client is OC 
MAC 
• Authorized body for coordinate the 
tenants with a office granted 
• No authorities 
 
Table 2.1 Comparisons of Different Bodies’ Authorities Before and After the 
Implementation of the TPS 
 
 41 
 
Therefore, we know that various parties have changes on their duties and role. The most 
important changes of role are owners and HA since they are the main parties involved in the 
transaction in TPS. The portion of property rights remains to round 40% only among all 39 
TPS estate on average. That means approximately 60% of tenants buy their sitting flats. 
Although the portion of property rights is smaller than the sum of all the owners, HA is the 
largest signal owner in every TPS estate. No matter how large the property right does HA 
owns in the TPS estate, the representative from HA can only have one vote in the OC for 
voting in making decision. Furthermore, the representative always keeps his stand neutral. As 
a result, even HA has the most property rights in the TPS estate, it gives up the rights in 
making decision in OC meeting. It is also one of the features in the operation system of the 
TPS estate. 
 
 
2.6 Deeds of Mutual Covenant and Its Applications in the TPS 
 
DMC is a crucial element in the building management so as to provide comfortable and safe 
living environment of private housing in Hong Kong. It states the management mechanism 
and responsibilities of different parties within a private development. On the other hand, all 
privatized public housing estates are regarded as a private development. Therefore, DMCs are 
used to govern these estates under the TPS. However, these DMCs are considered as the 
source of conflicts which is the idea of the first proposition of this dissertation. In this chapter, 
a deep investigation will be carried out in order to understand more the rationales and 
practices of DMC in Hong Kong. Then, the proposition will be examined by studying the 
DMC in the TPS estate and conducting a case study.  
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Deeds of Mutual Covenant in Hong Kong 
Uses of DMC 
In Hong Kong, most of the developments are tall buildings which home more than hundred of 
units inside the building. It is called a multi-unit development. However, the owners of those 
units in a multi-unit development do not own their units (Nield, 1990). They own an 
undivided share in the build. Under the common law system, those owners are holding the 
whole building together as tenants in common. Therefore, owners do not own the unit but 
rather a share of the whole building (Walter, 2002). That means other owners of the building 
can freely entre your unit in this situation. Obviously, it is ridiculous and impossible to 
happen in Hong Kong. Therefore, the idea of exclusive used area rises which let the owner is 
able to use a part of the building to the exclusion of the other owners. As a result, DMC was 
evolved to handle the exclusive use areas and common areas in a multi-storey building. 
Generally, exclusive use areas means the flats and car parking spaces while common use area 
means gardens, yards, swimming pools, tennis courts, etc (Kent, 2008). Moreover, common 
areas also include common facilities and common access area, for example, machine room 
and passageways. Exclusive use area and common parts are mutually exclusive but they are 
not physically separated from each other. DMC will also determine the right and obligations 
of the owners over these areas.  
 
On the other hand, DMC also play a very important role in managing the multi-unit 
development. It includes the details of the management of the building and allows for the 
employment of a property manager (Chan, 2008). The most common structure adopted is to 
provide that the co-owners are individually responsible for the areas over which they have the 
exclusive use and for the co-owners to be collectively responsible for the common parts and 
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facilities (Nield, 1990). Therefore, a property manager is appointed by the owners according 
to the DMC. Authority will be given to the property manager to manage the common areas 
and facilities of the whole building. For example, he has the right to charge a management fee 
thought appropriate and to decide the amount of capital held in the reserve fund (Walters & 
Hastings, 1998). 
 
Development of a DMC 
As mentioned above, DMC is the most common form of management structure of private 
multi-storey buildings in Hong Kong. However, it is always misunderstood in his nature. 
Many people think it just like a contract binding the owners and developer in private housing. 
In fact, DMC is a deed which is a formal legal document that is made by the parties executing 
it. In order to executing a deed, signing, sealing and delivering are need. Delivery is an act 
done which shows an intention to be bound by the terms of the instrument (Kent, 2008). Thus, 
a deed is more than a contract. 
 
Under a DMC, the owners restrict the use of their land by granting rights over it to each other 
and by imposing obligations in the form of covenants (Kent, 2008). So, the definition of 
covenant should be studied. Covenant is regarded as a reciprocal promise contained in a deed. 
There are two parties under a covenant which are covenanter and convenantee. For a land 
covenant, a covenanter promises to do or not to do something on his own land for the benefit 
of the land of convenantee. Therefore, DMC is used to protect the right of all residents in a 
multi-unit development.  
 
Nowadays, nearly all housing in private sector has DMC so as to protect the interest of all 
owners in the building. However, there is no duty to ask the owners to manage their properties 
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in common law. It depends on the owner whether to manage the property or not. Therefore, 
there are a small number of buildings which do not have DMC to manage the building. 
However, they may not be inefficiently managed. It depends on the co-operation of the 
owners. However, this kind of management will be reactive rather proactive.  
Before 1987, there is no guideline for drafting a DMC. It can be freely drafted by the 
developer who could take care of their own interests. In 1987, the government discovered that 
the increasing number of court cases for unfair DMC drafted by developers. Government 
introduces a non-statutory system for approval of DMCs in response to public concern about 
the fairness of DMCs. Guidelines for drafting DMCs came into effect from 1 December 1987. 
There are several amendments in the guideline in order to suit the current situation. The most 
recent amendment was made in 2007. 
 
After a DMC is drafted, it will come into effect by signing with the first purchaser of the 
development. All other buyers have to accept the signed DMC with no objection. Although 
guideline is provided in drafting the DMC, it is important for the buyer to read the DMC 
carefully before buying in order to protect their interest. It is because it is almost impossible 
to vary any term in the DMC. The terms of a DMC are writ in stone. In the case of Cheung 
Yuet v The Incorporated Owners of Oriental Garden [1979], it said that it may be possible to 
vary the DMC which has to prove that constant breaches by a number of owners that have 
gone unremedied have led to acquiescence by the remaining owners so that they can no 
longer take any action upon the covenant (Kent, 2008). 
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Deeds of Mutual Covenant in the TPS 
Relationship between HA and owners in TPS 
As we know that, in principle, there is no different between a private multi-storey 
development and an estate under the TPS. However, in reality, a number of differences are 
discovered. Thus, this part will study these differences. Then, their influences will also be 
examined based on the theories studied in Chapter Two. 
 
The first difference between a normal DMC and a DMC under the TPS is the relationship 
between developer and buyers. In normal situation, the developer will draft the DMC and 
then sign with the first purchaser in order to make it come into effect. Afterward, the 
developer will not be the owner anymore after selling all the units although it may retain 
some right in managing the facilities. Basically, the developer will not own any of the units 
after sale. The properties will be managed according to the DMC (Diagram 2.3). 
 
Diagram 2.3 Relationships Between Owners and Developer of Signing a DMC 
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In the other hand, under the TPS, the situation is different. Originally, HA is the sole owner of 
the public estate. Through privatization, HA act as a developer to sell the units to the sitting 
tenants. Therefore, the DMC is drafted by HA with no doubt. However, in TPS, the sitting 
tenants can choose to buy their units. In this case, the consequence of the sale is different. The 
developer (HA) will due hold a number of units in the development while the developer will 
also be involved in the DMC acting as an owner. In simple wording, on one hand, HA is a 
developer. On the other hand, HA is also an owner, usually the biggest owner. As a result, the 
relationship between developer and owners is different (Diagram 2.4). 
        
 
Diagram 2.4 Relationship Between HA and Owners of Signing a DMC 
 
 
Difficulties in defining common areas in the TPS 
Before 1987, DMCs of private multi-unit development may not contain a definition of the 
common areas (Kent, 2008). Due to increasing number of conflicts on the responsibilities on 
the common parts of the development, a definition and a plan of the common parts are 
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required to be stated in the DMC. As mentioned in previous chapter, common areas and 
exclusive use areas are mutually exclusive. Therefore, for defining common parts of a 
development, it is actually a task in determining whether that part is an exclusive use area. In 
general, that part of the building will not be a common area if any owner is given the right to 
exclusive possession of that part. Usually, common parts of a development include external 
walls, corridors, stairways, lifts, garden and playground.  
 
In the TPS, although the same definition is put in the DMC, there is a large difference in 
implementation due to the unique characteristics of public housing estates. For public rental 
estates, they were not designed for selling when they were under construction. Therefore, the 
design of public housing estates is relatively open compare to the private housing while all 
people from public can enter the estates freely and use the facilities in the public rental estate. 
It is because all these areas and facilities were built by using the money from public. As a 
result, all people can enjoy the facilities inside, for example, playground, garden, etc.  
 
Moreover, usually large common area was involved in the estate because all the management 
and maintenance fees are responsible by HA. However, after the implementation of DMC, all 
these fees are responsible by owners, including HA as a biggest owner. Therefore, for a DMC 
of the TPS, it is not just cover the common areas among owners and tenants, but also the 
public area sharing with the public. 
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From the information above, owner play an important role in the building management 
structure in order to make decision for the estate.  In the TPS, HA, as the biggest owner, 
plays a more important role in its development. There were totally 39 public rental housing 
estates sold in the TPS. Around 70% of the tenants had bought their sitting unit. Therefore, 
HA would be the owners of the 30% of resident in every estate under TPS 
Importance of the incentive of the HA in the TPS 
On one hand, the HA is acting as a government body to provide low rent housing for the 
low-income families in Hong Kong. In the TPS, the tenants, people who do not buy their 
sitting unit during TPS, still have the same relationship with the HA. HA has the 
responsibility to provide services for the tenants in the public rental housing units. The living 
practice of tenants should remain unchanged. On the other hand, the HA is the developer of 
those public housing estates under the TPS. It has to draft DMC and make arrangement for 
selling. Furthermore, the HA is also the biggest owner of all the TPS estate. Therefore, the HA 
plays three roles under the TPS. The situation can be shown graphically by making use of the 
diagram used in Chapter Two. Diagram 2.5 shows that the shaded area is responsible the HA.  
Firstly, DMC is drafted by the HA because it is the developer. Also, OC involve the HA 
because it is an owner. TMU is a unit set up by the HA to manage the tenants specifically in 
the TPS. For PMU, it is also an ad hoc unit organized by the HA in order to manage the estate 
under the transition period. It will be replace by a private PMA after two years. Therefore, the 
HA is a core party for leading the TPS to success. 
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Diagram 2.5 Areas Responsible by the HA in the TPS 
 
 
2.7 Objectives 
 
In 1998, many of the myopics think that TPS is a milestone of the public housing. Even more, 
TPS was regarded as a win-win policy for both the HKHA and the public rental tenants. On 
one hand, HKHA can reduce the burden on the public housing. On the other hand, the tenants 
could enjoy the ownership and became a homeowner. However, after 5 years of termination 
of TPS, many problems were discovered and many conflicts were happened. The overall aim 
 50 
 
of this study is to examine the causes of the conflicts in TPS operation system. Although a 
number of researches have been on evaluating the TPS, none of them care about the 
management and communication in those estates. By the increasing number of conflicts, a 
need is seen to study on the nature and causes of conflicts. After understanding the operation 
of the TPS and by making use of the supporting theories, the conflicts will be studied and the 
causes will be found out. 
 
There are different kinds of problems in the TPS estate. However, in order to make this 
dissertation more specific, those problems which is common in housing of private sector will 
be eliminated. TPS is a transaction between tenants and HA so as to make the tenants become 
owners of their sitting flats. As a result, three parties are involved in the TPS estate including 
HA, owners and tenants. In this situation, the writer discovered that the main source of 
conflicts come from the relationship between HA and owners. The most obvious one is the 
sharing of the management and maintenance fees. By DMC, the share of these fees is 
distributed to all owners according to their owning percentage. Due to the unclear definition 
of common area in the DMC, many public areas, for example, pathway, are counted as 
common areas in the TPS estate. It causes large burden to the owners. They argue that those 
responsibilities should not be borne by them. Therefore, conflicts arise between owners and 
HA. Therefore, Proposition 1 can be stated as follows: 
 
Conflicts arise between owners and HA due to the incompleteness of the DMC. 
 
Secondly, OC is a place where owners make decision in private housing. In TPS estate, same 
operation system is applied which has mentioned in the previous part. However, OC is not an 
efficient decision making group. Conflicts always arise on the OC’s decision. Writer believes 
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that the causes of the conflicts are the lack of motivation in management the TPS estate. Also, 
HA want to prevent the critique of intervention of TPS operation from politics. However, due 
to low participation of HA in OC, the decision made may not represent all the residents in the 
estate including tenants. It makes the management of the estate inefficient. Therefore, 
problems do not only arise because of DMC (first proposition). Therefore, Proposition 2 can 
be stated as follows: 
 
Management of the TPS estates is inefficient due to the lack of incentive of HA 
 
To conclude, in this dissertation, the aim is to ascertain the causes of these problems and 
conflicts in operation system of the TPS. The propositions are subjected for further 
investigations in the following chapters in order to explain whether it is tenable or not. 
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
In first part of this chapter, some theories related to the privatization, ownership and mixed 
tenure are studied in order to understand more about the privatization of public housing and 
its operation methods around the world. In the second part, history and policies of public 
housing development are narrated so as to know the rationales for holding those policies. 
Then, details of Tenants Purchase Scheme are reviewed which is followed by the theory of 
behavioral economic. Finally, propositions of this dissertation are written based on the 
concept of behavioral economics and the uniqueness of the TPS operation system. 
 
This chapter creates useful theoretical background to support the whole research. More 
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analysis on the conflicts of TPS will be done in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Three      Objectives, Methodology and Data 
 
The objective of this Chapter is to outline the methodology chosen for this study, and to 
consider the sources of data. Firstly, the objective and propositions of the study will be 
restated, and then the methodology and data will be explained. In principal, the study utilizes 
content analysis of various secondary documents to search for evidence that is considered to 
support or otherwise the propositions. 
 
 
3.1 Objective and Propositions 
 
As stated in the previous Chapter, the overall aim of this study is to examine the causes of the 
conflicts in TPS operation system. Although a number of researches have been on evaluating 
the TPS, none of them care about the management and communication in those estates. By 
the increasing number of conflicts, a need is seen to study on the nature and causes of 
conflicts. After understanding the operation of the TPS and by making use of the supporting 
theories, the conflicts will be studied and the causes will be found out.  The study aims to 
achieve this objective by searching for evidence to support or otherwise two objectives.   
 
Proposition 1 can be restated as follows: 
 
Conflicts arise between owners and HA due to the incompleteness of the DMC. 
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Proposition 2 can be stated as follows: 
 
Management of the TPS estates is inefficient due to the lack of incentive of HA 
 
The next section considers methodology. 
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
This research follows generally a qualitative approach to finding evidence to support or 
otherwise the objective and propositions, concentrating on case study research. Qualitative 
research is seen as one of the many approaches in the various research methodologies that aim 
to systematically collecting and analyzing valid and reliable information in given context, in 
order to address research problems (Kayrooz, 2005). Although its definition can be easily 
understood, it needs further consideration to fully appreciate it complexity. Researches are 
mainly divided into two types which are qualitative and quantitative researches. Generally, 
qualitative research is referring to meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, 
symbols and descriptions of things. On the other hand, quantitative research is to counts and 
measures of thing and its effects (Berg, 2001).  
 
Most qualitative research focuses on the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between the researcher and what is studied and situational constraints that shape 
inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). It is also useful in investigating the behavior of 
individual in the society.  For this dissertation, the flaw of the TPS management system in 
operation and the causes of the conflicts will be studied. These are a kind of social policy and 
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human behavior. Qualitative research is seen to be more suitable for research of this nature. 
Data to conduct qualitative research can be primary (questionnaires, etc.) or from secondary 
published sources, as will be used for this study.  Cases of conflicts arising from TPS 
arrangements will be identified in newspapers and other media, as well as formal sources such 
as Legislative Council records. Further, journals, literature, newspapers and books will be 
consulted to find data to obtain credible evidence to explain the causes of conflicts in the TPS 
generally, and consider the validity of the propositions specifically.  The focus on cases 
requires a note on case study research, which is seen to represent an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994).  
 
Case studies can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence. Moreover, 
direct and detailed observations are not necessary for being a source of evidence in case study 
method. Nevertheless, the source of evidence is an essential component of case study method 
undoubtedly. According to Yin (1994), there are mainly six sources of evidence which are 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations and 
physical artifacts. The strengths and weaknesses are illustrated in Table 3.1. 
 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation 
• Stable 
• Exact 
• Broad Coverage 
• Low retrievability 
• Biased selective 
 
Archival Records 
• Precise 
• Quantitative 
• Low retrievability 
• Low accessibility 
Interviews 
• Targeted 
• Insightful 
• Bias of interviewees 
• Inaccuracies 
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Direct Observation 
• Reality 
• Contextual 
• Time-consuming 
• High cost 
Participant-Observation 
• Reality 
• Contextual 
• Insightful  
• Time-consuming 
• High cost 
• Bias of investigators 
Physical Artifacts 
• Insightful • Selectivity 
• Low availability 
 
Table 3.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Different Source of Evidence 
 
In this dissertation, documentation is the only source of evidence of the case study because of 
the low availability of other sources and time constraints. Actually, there are many different 
types of documentation. Nonetheless, they must be explicit data, for example, letters, 
memoranda, agendas, newspaper, administrative documents. Newspaper clipping will be used 
for this resource. The details of data collection will be discussed in the next part. 
 
 
3.3 Data  
 
Data collection is a very vital step in case study which must be reliable and precise. For this 
dissertation, as the source of evidence is the newspaper clipping, it is not that difficult for 
collecting. However, it is not easy to find out all the news related to TPS from all the 
newspaper. Therefore, a mass media electric data base is used for data collection which is 
called Wisenews. It contains all Chinese newspaper articles including Hong Kong starting 
from 1997. As TPS was started in 1998, conflicts in TPS estates must be happened afterward. 
So, wisenews is capable for data collection in this dissertation. 
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From the electric data base, by the date of 12th January 2010, there are 1273 news about TPS 
which include the details of the scheme, the criticism of the scheme, general news and, the 
most importantly, the conflict incidents of TPS. Due to the focus of this dissertation, the first 
three kinds of news can be eliminated. Only for the conflicts in the TPS estates, there are 132 
cases. They are classified into four categories which are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Categories of Conflicts Number of Cases 
Between Owners and Tenants 16 
Between Owners and Owners 20 
Between Owners and HA 22 
Between Tenants and HA 29 
Others 45 
Total 132 
   Table 3.2 Number of Conflicts in Different Categories 
 
Since TPS estates are also private property, there are some common problems, for instance, 
the right of keeping pets, noise, etc. However, the focus will only be put in the operation 
system of the TPS. Those common problems will not be examined and deducted from the list. 
The new figure is shown in Table 3.3. 
 
 
Categories of Conflicts Number of Cases 
Between Owners and Tenants 3 
Between Owners and Owners 15 
Between Owners and HA 22 
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Between Tenants and HA 29 
Others 15 
Total 84 
   Table 3.3 Number of Conflicts in Different Categories after Filtering 
 
The second and third categories remain unchanged as HA is rarely involved conflicts in 
private sector as well as HOS. From these cases, the category of “Between Owners and HA” 
should be studied and made as a case study in this research because only this categories can 
cover all the parties involved in the propositions and able to prove the proposition right or not 
logically. Therefore, deep investigation was done on those cases.  
 
In order to facilitate in studying the two propositions in this dissertation, further classification 
is done by making use of their nature of conflicts. Since the key areas in the propositions are 
the DMC and the management structure of the TPS, those cases related to these areas are 
extracted to be evidence in examining the proposition. Table 3.4 is showing the cases 
extracted and their brief content. The complete contents of these conflicts are attached as 
Appendix II. 
 
Article No. Content 
Conflicts related to DMC of the TPS 
1 
It is a dispute of sharing of the slope maintenance fee, but the area of the 
slope is larger than the area of the estate. 
2 
It is a case of changing the layout of the house which cause inconvenient 
and harm to other residents. 
3 
It is an article concerning the DMC in the TPS. The writer blame on the 
transparency of drafting the DMC 
4 It is a case in Heng On Estate for unfair sharing the road maintenance fee. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of Selected Evidence  
 
 
 
 
A large demonstration was held by the owners. 
5 
It is another article concerning about the Heng On Estate case. The main 
focus is the fairness of the DMC in the TPS 
6 
It is an article written by a legislative council member to evaluate the TPS. 
Many residents was unsatisfied by the large amount of management fee 
7 
It is a news article concerning the DMC in the TPS. Interviews of 
residents, legislative council member and HA representative were done in 
expressing their views. 
8 
Legislative council members blame for the bureaucracy of the HA in 
making the DMC of the TPS. 
Conflicts related to the management structure of TPS 
9 
It is a complaint from the owner of the TPS. He complained the repair 
work done by HA before sale was perfunctory. 
10 
It is a case for urgent maintenance for water leakage in playground. HA 
did nothing for the incident because HA claimed that it is the 
responsibility of OC  
11 
It is an article reflecting the situation of the operation of OC in the TPS. 
Although HA had assisted in setting up the OC, its management was in 
chaos due to the lack of experience and knowledge. 
12 
It is an article focusing on the mixed tenure in the TPS. It is difficult to 
manage the mixed tenure estate without the assistance of HA. 
13 
It is a complaint from resident for the quality of HA repair work in the 
guarantee period.   
14 
It is an article concerning about the transition period of the TPS estates. It 
is important to have the HA’s assistance in order to prevent chaotic 
management. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, case study methodology and its applications are introduced where the 
explanatory case study is chosen as the most suitable type of case study method among the six 
types of method. After that, due to time and cost limitation, newspaper clipping and 
documentation are the source of evidence in this methodology, and its data collection details 
are also illustrated in this chapter. Moreover, the criteria of data selection are also explained 
based on the proposition. Finally, the selected data, including news and secondary document, 
is briefly described so as to have a better understanding in the following chapters.  
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Chapter Four      Analysis and Discussion 
 
In this chapter, analysis will be carried out on the data collected so as to examine the 
proposition purposed in the previous chapter. All those data is regarded as the evidence which 
is collected from different resource, for example, newspaper clipping, Legislation Council 
document, etc. In the first part of this chapter, the analysis and discussion of the first 
proposition will be illustrated. The main focus will be on the incompleteness of the DMC. 
Then, the second proposition will be investigated. It is mainly on the area of the management 
structure in the TPS. 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Deeds of Mutual Covenant in the TPS 
 
 
 
Incompleteness of DMC under the TPS 
In this part, problems of DMC will be investigated. In order to make the study more specific, 
the general problems of DMC will not be studies. Due to the uniqueness of the DMC 
mentioned in the previous parts, there are some problems which will only occur in the TPS.  
The concept of incompleteness is explained in Chapter two which mean there are flaws in the 
agreement that lead to conflicts between parties. The cause of the incompleteness is the 
bounded rationality of human being. Those conflicts usually evolve due to the unforeseeable 
contingencies which are not written down in the agreement. For the incompleteness of a DMC, 
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it refers to the contingencies which are unforeseeable in the process of managing the 
properties. For example, in a normal private multi-unit development, uses of the common area 
are not clearly stated which lead to the misuse of the common areas by the residents. 
 
Due to the design of the public estates and bounded rationality of the drafter of the DMC, it is 
difficult to accurately determine the common areas of the owner and the public areas used by 
all people. Also, by the definition of common area in a normal DMC, all the public space 
should be regarded as the common area in the DMC because no one has the exclusive right in 
using those areas 
 
Moreover, for DMC under the TPS, many people query that the fairness of the DMC. Firstly, 
conflict of interest occurs because HA is the biggest owner while the DMC is drafted by HA. 
All of the public areas are regarded as the common area in the DMC. On one hand, the 
government can reduce the burden in subsidizing the public rental housing. On the other hand, 
the government can also transfer the responsibilities of managing the public goods to the TPS 
owners. Even though HA insisted that the DMCs were drafted according to the guideline and 
approved by the government, it is obvious that HA is a sole beneficial party. It pays less 
money in managing the facilities, but it can still provide those facilities to the public. 
From the above description, there is a large contradiction in determining the common areas in 
the estate in the TPS. It can clearly show that the incompleteness of the DMC in the estates 
under TPS.  
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In this part, several cases will be introduced in order to examine the first proposition of this 
dissertation. Firstly, the reasons for choosing those cases will be explained briefing in a form 
of table. Then, all cases will be illustrated one by one so as to find evidence in proofing the 
proposition. 
Case Studies 
 
Introduction of Cases used in the analysis 
Case Content Article 
1 Heng On Estate Case 
Heng On Estate is located at Ma On Shan which is one of the estates in 
the first phase of TPS. In 2003, there was a big demonstration for 
complaining the unfair DMC of the estate. The owners in the estate had 
to pay HK$8,000,000 for maintaining the road which was mainly used by 
the HA. The reason for choosing this case for examining the first 
proposition is that Heng On Estate is one typical public rental housing 
estate in Hong Kong. It consists of ten blocks of residential building, one 
shopping centre, and one car parking building. It is a very typical 
situation for analysis the DMC because only those residential blocks were 
sold. The HA will still keep the shopping centre and car parking spaces. 
Also, it was one of the biggest conflicts of unfair DMC in the TPS 
estates. 
In this case, the most important thing has to find out the incompleteness 
of the DMC. Also, it is used to proof the incompleteness is the cause of 
the conflict by studying the case. 
 
1, 4, 5 
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2 Tin Ping Estate Case 
Ting Ping Estate was public rental housing estate in Fanling. It was 
privatized in the phase two of the TPS. The reason for using this case is 
not the design characteristics of the estate. It is a conflict on amending the 
layout of the flat in the TPS which seriously affect the living environment 
of the neighborhood. This kind of conflict also happened in other estates 
but the information is more comprehensive in Tin Ping Estates Case. 
There is no clear and reliable term in the DMC for controlling the 
changing of design inside the flat. Also, these cases also can show the 
equity of owners and tenants is different. 
It is importance to find out the evidence of incompleteness in the DMC 
which show that the DMC is not comprehensive enough for monitor the 
activities of owners and tenants. It finally causes the conflict in the TPS 
estate. 
2 
Table 4.1 Cases Introduction for the First Proposition 
 
 
Sharing of Maintenance Fee (Article 1, 4 and 5 in the Appendix II) 
 
In the previous part, we know that the DMC in the TPS is incomplete. In this part, conflict 
cases in the TPS will be cited to act as evidence in examining how the incompleteness causes 
the conflicts in the TPS.  
 
Firstly, it was a conflict case of Heng On Estate in Ma On Shan in 2003. The blasting fuse of 
this conflict was the sharing of maintenance fee of a road inside the estate. This project 
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needed HK$10,000,000 to finish repairing the road. According to the DMC, this amount of 
money was share on the proportion of the construction floor area owned by all owners. For 
Heng On Estate, 80% of the public rental units were sold by the TPS. Thus, HA owns around 
20% of property right in the estate. With simple calculation, HA would pay HK$2,000,000 to 
repair the road. The rest would be responsible by the owners. 
 
In many public housing estates, like Heng On Estate, they are so comprehensive which 
include shopping centre, car parking building, wet market, etc. For the TPS, only those 
residential building blocks and public space, like parks and roads, are regarded as the sale 
areas in TPS. Therefore, besides the exclusive use area, other stated space is considered as the 
common area in the estate and responsible by all the owners. On the other hand, the shopping 
centre, car parking spaces and wet market are still owned solely by HA.  
 
In this case, the road to be repaired was used by all vehicles entering Heng On Estate. Over 
70% of the usage of the road is the vehicles going to shopping centre and market where run 
by the HA. Moreover, there is a HOS estate next to Heng On Estate while the vehicles have to 
pass the road in Heng On Estate in order to entre that HOS estate. Thus, the remaining 30% of 
usage of the road was not totally used by the owners of Heng On Estate. Therefore, in this 
case, the lower usage of the road, the higher the maintenance fee has to be paid. It is 
obviously unfair to the owners of Heng On Estate. Suppose the owners of Heng On Estate are 
the weakest parties for paying maintenance fee comparing to the HOS owners and HA. 
Unfortunately, TPS owners have to pay the largest amount of money due to the DMC.  
 
On the other hand, many politics query that HA held all the property with incomes 
deliberately and did not sell in the TPS while all low value facilities, for instance playground, 
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were sold to the owner. Thus, the revenue of HA was unchanged but the expenditure was 
decrease because those expenditure was share among HA and owners. 
 
As a result, a large demonstration was held in the estate in 2003 to block all the vehicles from 
entering. Owners thought that it was not a fair way to share the responsibility of the 
management of facilities. It should be based on the “pay by using” principle. Nevertheless, 
the HA argued that it was reasonable and fair to share the maintenance fee by the proportion 
of owning in the TPS. 
 
By the case in Heng On Estate, it is so clear that it is an unforeseeable contingency of the 
DMC. Due to the bounded rationality, such an unforeseeable event occurred. By the 
behavioral assumption in behavioral economics, both parties will solve this contingency by 
fighting for their largest advantage. It makes the DMC incomplete due to the opportunism. 
Therefore, by the case study, one of the causes of the conflicts in the TPS is affirmed while 
the first proposition of this dissertation is examined. 
 
 
Changing the layout of the unit (Article 2 in Appendix II) 
 
In the second case, the conflict occurred between tenants and owner in Tin Ping Estate which 
was one of the public housing estates under the TPS in Fanling. The owner in this case 
changed the layout of his unit by putting the kitchen to the balcony so as to make the bedroom 
bigger. However, this change greatly affected the resident living around since the smoke and 
oil will rise and entre to the upper units. One of the victims, a tenant, in the upper unit 
complained to HA. Unfortunately, the HA said that it could not handle the complaint as that 
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unit was sold. The only way is to report to the management company. However, management 
claimed that it is not clearly stated in the DMC that the privatized units could not be 
rearranged the layout.  
 
For a public rental housing unit, any changes in layout, structure, windows and doors are not 
allowed. Otherwise, HA have the right to terminate the lease of that tenant. For the private 
housing, the condition usually stated clearly in the DMC on whether the design can be 
changed. Nevertheless, the DMCs of the TPS estates did not state clearly for changing the 
design of the unit. It is obviously that it is the loophole of the DMC. 
 
From this case, one thing can be realized that there many more than one loophole of the DMC 
besides sharing the maintenance and repair fees in the TPS. Conflicts can also rise between 
owners and tenants due to the incompleteness of the DMC. 
 
 
Discussion in case study (Article 3, 6 and 7) 
 
Besides those actual conflicts, there are also some newspaper articles concerning the loophole 
and unfairness of DMC. One of the articles points out that the quality of facilities in public 
rental housing estates are poor. Repair and maintenance have to be done frequently. If all 
these responsibilities transfer to the owners after privatization, it must be a great burden 
especially for the low-income family. Nevertheless, HA insist that it is a fair solution for 
sharing the fees by the proportion of owning. 
 
The other two articles are concerning about the process in drafting the DMC. The articles 
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suggest collecting the opinion of resident during the DMC drafting process for the TPS. It is 
because the design of the every public rental housing estate is different, for example, size of 
the estate, the number of facilities, etc. It is important to investigate the situation of every TPS 
estate before privatization. Although this suggestion was made in 1999 which after two 
phases of TPS, no amendment was made for the following phases of the TPS in drafting the 
DMC. It could also show the bureaucracy of the government. However, it is not our focus in 
this dissertation. 
 
The article also suggests that the maintenance fee should be shared on the principle of “user 
pay”. It would be fair to the owners of the TPS. However, the situation cannot be change 
because it is almost impossible to amend the DMC except with the agreement of all owners 
including HA. No matter there is a better method in tackling the problem. All articles above 
state that the DMCs of the TPS have problems in protecting the right of all resident. Therefore, 
based on the concept of behavioral economics, the DMCs are regarded as an incomplete 
agreement. More importantly, most of the conflicts in the TPS are caused by the DMC.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, a detailed investigation of DMC has been done in order to understand more 
the uniqueness and the background of the DMC in the TPS. It finds that there is a difficulty in 
defining common areas in public housing estate because the originally use is not for sale. 
However, drafter of the DMC used the same concept private development for the TPS and did 
not realize the problem in the future due to the bounded rationality. On the other hand, the 
DMC may be drafted deliberately in order to reduce the running cost of HA because of the 
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opportunism in behavioral assumption. 
 
Due to the problems in drafting the DMC, it makes the DMC become an incomplete 
agreement. On the ground of this incomplete agreement, the parties involved in the agreement 
will argue in order to fight for the largest advantage. That means owners and HA will have 
conflicts with each other. By providing case studies in this chapter, the situation is clearer to 
realize the DMC of TPS. The first proposition is also be examined and affirmed by using real 
cases occurred in the TPS. 
 
 
4.2. Building Management Structure of the TPS and the Incentive of 
Housing Authority 
In this part, the second proposition will be investigated. First, the background information of 
building management structure in Hong Kong will be introduced briefly so as to 
understanding the normal structure of building management in private multi-storey 
development. Afterward, the management structure of the TPS will be studied and the case 
studies will also be done in order to examine the role of HA in the TPS. With the analysis of 
the cases and documents, the second proposition of this dissertation will also be examined 
ultimately. 
 
Quite a number of words are used to study the DMC in the previous part. It is true that DMC 
plays an important in a private multi-unit development. However, it is just a deed to state the 
definitions of exclusive use areas and common areas, and the rights and obligations of the 
owners. Although the common areas are stated clearly in the DMC, it does not provide any 
Normal Building Management Structure in Hong Kong 
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method in managing those common areas. It is impossible for the owners to responsible for a 
part of common area. Therefore, in order to make the management and decision making 
processes more efficient. Owners’ Corporation (OC) is formed in many of the private 
development. 
 
An OC is a body corporate set up under the Building Management Ordinance (BMO). OC is 
usually set up according to the clauses in DMC. For instance, OC must be set up within 6 
months after signing up the DMC. It has the legal status to represent all owners in managing 
the common parts of the building (Home Affairs Department, 2007). Also, OC is empowered 
to employ the property manager to manage the property they own. The powers and duty are 
clearly stated in the Section 16 of BMO. 
 
“Rights, powers, privileges and duties of the owners in relation to the 
common parts of the building shall be exercised and performed by the OC. 
The liabilities of the owners in relation to the common parts of the building 
shall also be enforceable by OC” (Cap344, Section16) 
 
As the powers and duty of OC are complicated, the variation of management structure of 
different building may be very large which is difficult to handle by the court if dispute occur. 
Therefore, Code of Practice on Building Management and Maintenance is issued in order to 
publicize standard of management and maintenance of the common parts for compliance by 
owners, OC, manager and building management agent (Kent, 2008). Details can refer to the 
full copy of the code of practice which is attached as Appendix III.   
 
Therefore, OC is a body representing all the owners in the development. OC has to owner 
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meetings to make decision on different kinds of issue, for example, employment of property 
management company, decoration of the lift lobby, etc. As a result, one of the importances of 
OC is to make decision which can represent the thought of all owners.  
 
However, according to the group decision theory of Robert S. mentioned in Chapter Two, 
group decision can never be satisfied all the people. It just tries to attempt the highest 
proportion of the satisfaction among the people in the meeting. Usually, formal voting by 
taking simple majority is used in owners’ corporation in Hong Kong. As a result, a number of 
owners may not agree with the result of voting. Moreover, management company will also 
send a representative to the OC’s meeting in order to provide some information and opinion in 
solving the problems or making the decisions but the representative does not have the voting 
right. For tenants, they can express the opinion to the owners but they have no right to make 
decision. Nevertheless, the owners can represent the tenant to express the opinion to OC. The 
relationship can be simply described by Diagram 4.1. 
 
Diagram 4.1 Relationship Between Tenants, Owners and Property Management Company 
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Conflicts may arise between owners. It is one of the common conflicts within a multi-unit 
development between owners. There is also a common dispute in the financial arrangement in 
operating the OC. For example, owners may think that the amount of maintenance fee is too 
big and query the chairman of the OC in stealing the money. 
 
For the TPS, the operation principle is exactly the same with the normal building management 
structure because the estates under the TPS are also governed by the BMO. However, all the 
estates under the TPS are mixed tenure estates. That means there are quite a large proportion 
of tenants in a multi-unit development. Unfortunately, as mentioned before, tenants can only 
express their opinion to the owners or the property management company. Therefore, the 
structure will be different from the normal building management structure. In the TPS, there 
is only one owner for all the tenants which is HA. On the other hand, the owners under the 
TPS scheme cannot rent out their unit without paying the premium. Therefore, only a few 
owners will rent their unit out. Diagram 4.2 describes the unique management structure of the 
TPS.  
Building Management Structure in the TPS 
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Diagram 4.2 Relationship Between Tenants, HA, Owners and Property Management 
Company in the TPS Management Structure 
 
So, the whole management structure of the TPS and the operating system of the OC rely on 
the performance of the HA. Now, some case studies will be used to examined the influences 
of the management inefficiency with respect to the incentive of the HA. Table 4.2 will briefly 
illustrated the cased being used in this part of analysis. 
Case Studies 
 
Introduction of Cases used in the Analysis 
Case Content Articles 
3 Cheung Wah Estate 
Cheung Wah Estate was a public housing estate in Fanling 
which was sold in the phase four of the TPS. It is case for the 
10 
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inefficient management of the urgent maintenance for a water 
leakage. The reason for finding this case for analysis is the 
management procedure is stated in the newspaper clearly which 
can help in examining the incentive of the HA. 
In this case, the writer have to find out the role of the HA in 
reality and the incentive of the HA. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to see if the management is efficient or not. 
4 Po Lam Estate 
It is a public rental housing estate in Cheung Kwan O which is 
sold in the phase 4 of the TPS. It is a problem in running the OC. 
Complaint was received for insufficient help from HA in 
operating the OC. The reason for choosing this case is that it can 
show directly how the HA participate in the OC. 
It is vital to find evidence from this case in proofing the HA is 
no interest in participating the management of the TPS estates. 
Finally, it leads to inefficient management in the TPS estates.   
11, 12 
Table 4.2 Cases Introduction for the Second Proposition 
 
Shrinking the responsibility of managing the properties in the TPS (Article 10 in the 
Appendix II) 
It is a complaint from Cheung Wah Estate in Fanling. There was a serious water leakage 
incident in the estate which caused flooding in the playground. One of the tenants, Mr. Chan, 
complained to the HA for the incident. Unfortunately, HA said that the playground is not an 
area responsible by the HA because it is sold under the TPS. The HA suggested him to make a 
complaint to the property management company of the estate instead. However, even though 
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the complaint was made to the management company, no one was sent to repair the leakage of 
the water pipe until ten days later.  
 
Under the management structure of the TPS, it is true that the responsibility in repairing the 
water pipes did not belong to the HA. However, it clearly show that the HA was shrink its 
responsibility of being an owner. The HA is the renter of all the tenants in the public rental 
estate even the estates under the TPS. Therefore, the HA is acting as an owner who has the 
obligation in receiving the opinion of the tenants. Furthermore, the HA should also have 
power to urge the management company to do repair work as soon as possible rather than 
doing nothing and ask its tenants to complain the management company. 
 
HA always uses the excuse of preventing interferences on the operations of privatized public 
rental housing estates. It is true that HA should not affect the management structure of the 
TPS estate governed by the BMO in the role of a government body. Nevertheless, as an owner, 
HA absolutely has the right to take part in the management of operation in order to improve 
the quality of management provided by the management company.  
 
From the above case, one fact can be discovered is the incentive of the HA in the estate 
management is low. Some other cases also show that the HA take less care for the complaints 
from tenants in the TPS. However, the HA has promised that the quality and system of 
services remain unchanged for the sitting tenants in the TPS estates.  Moreover, the quality 
of the repair work is low. By these facts, the incentive of the HA in building management is 
low after selling out the public rental housing units. It reduces the burden for the HA in 
running public housing. Unfortunately, the burden is transferred to the owners. 
 
 76 
 
In the management structure point of view, every owner has the right to express the opinion 
and to ask for improvement to the management company. For the HA, the role is more 
determinant because it represents the large number of resident in the estate. If the HA still 
keep the low incentive in the management structure in the TPS, it will cause the disaffection 
of the management. Conflicts will arise between tenants and owners easily. It is obviously an 
unfavorable outcome of the management structure of the TPS. It can be summarized that the 
inefficient management of the TPS estate is due to the lack of incentive of the HA. 
 
Insufficient assistance from the HA in the building management operation (Articles 11 and 
12 in the Appendix II)   
The other important role of the HA is a developer. It has the duty to help the owners in setting 
up the management structure, including the OC and employment of the management company. 
The article 11 and 12 are criticizing the HA for not enough assistance for the new owners of 
the TPS. The article emphasizes that residents living in the public rental housing are belong to 
low income and low education level group. It is difficult for them understand the concept of 
building management and OC. However, it is compulsory to set up OC to operate the 
management in the TPS estates. Therefore, the HA should help those owners in setting up the 
OC. 
 
 
In fact, support from the HA is limited in setting up OC. Many politics believe that HA just 
want to release the burden of management the public housing estate as soon as possible rather 
than help the low income to buy their own property. As a result, due to the lack of experience 
in building management, the cost of forming an OC is higher and the quality of the building 
management is lower. It is definitely an inefficient situation in management caused by the 
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lack of incentive of the HA. 
 
Although the HA is not the sole owner under the TPS, it is the most influencing party in the 
building management structure because it plays different roles in the structure, for example, 
owner, developer, property manager, etc. Therefore, the HA is determinant in maintaining an 
efficient management under the TPS. 
Conclusion 
 
Nevertheless, by the case studies carried out in this chapter, the HA is lacking incentive in 
managing the TPS estate. It can be classified into two aspects. Firstly, the HA shrink 
responsibility of acting as an owner. It rarely represents the tenants to express their opinion to 
the OC and monitoring the performance of the management company. Secondly, the HA 
should assist and provide opinion to the owners in setting up the OC. As a result, the 
management of the TPS by the OC is not efficient. It can be concluded that the reason is the 
lack of incentive of the HA. 
 
 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the main goal is to proof the two propositions in this dissertation. Therefore, 
this chapter is separated into two parts. Each part will be responsible for proofing one 
proposition by using various case studies happened in the TPS. Most of the source of 
evidence of the case studies is from the newspaper clipping and other secondary 
documentation. 
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In the first part, the first proposition is under investigation. Articles are used to illustrate the 
incompleteness of the DMC in the TPS. By taking note of the consequence of those incidents, 
a conclusion can be drawn where the causes of the conflicts are the incompleteness of the 
DMC in the TPS. In this part, eight articles are used in the case studies. There are totally three 
cases are used to examine the proposition. Finally, the proposition is proved. 
 
In the second part, the second proposition is going to be proved. The importance of the HA in 
the TPS is illustrated by documentation review and case study. Moreover, by studying the 
articles provided, the relationship of the role of the HA and the management inefficiency is 
found. Finally, the second proposition is proved by case studies. There are totally 6 newspaper 
articles are used to examine this proposition. 
 
After the case studies from various articles from different source, they all support the 
pr0position in this research. Therefore, the write can conclude that the two propositions in this 
dissertation are proved. 
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Chapter Five     Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary of the Study 
Housing policy is extremely political sensitive in Hong Kong. It is also a key factor to 
maintain a stable society. Although there are many different kinds of housing policies in Hong 
Kong, the most remarkable and notable one must be the public housing policy which has been 
implementing for more than 50 years since the tragedy in Shek Kip Mei squatter area. Due to 
the changes in the society, public housing policy is changing time to time. 
 
The TPS is regarded as a milestone in the public housing policy because it is the first success 
in privatizing the public rental housing in Hong Kong. There are many scholars conducting 
researches for the TPS. Most of these researches are focusing on the impact of the TPS on the 
private property market from the economics point of view and the impact of the privatizing 
public housing to the society from the social science point of view. However, there is limited 
number of researches considering the implementation of the TPS. After the termination of the 
TPS in 2002, the focus is put on the future trend of the public housing policy. It seems that no 
one would like to do some follow-up investigation on the TPS. However, in fact, there are 
many problems in implementing the TPS. As a result, conflicts between parties always occur. 
The writer would like to raise the awareness of pubic and politics in concerning about the 
conflicts occurred in the TPS by this dissertation 
 
In this dissertation, it starts with the fundamental theories and concept for understanding the 
rationale in launching the TPS for the sitting tenants of the public rental housing. Privatization 
policies of various countries are also studied. By doing this theoretical investigation and 
policies comparison, the propositions of this dissertation are drawn. The aim of this 
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dissertation is to examining the causes of conflicts in the TPS. 
 
DMC is a very important legal document in a multi-unit development in Hong Kong. It is the 
same case in the TPS. However, writer finds that there is unique incompleteness in the DMC 
of the TPS due to the role of the HA. Unfair terms exist in the DMC which increase the 
financial burden of the tenants. With assistance of the case studies and the document found, it 
is supported that the conflicts arise due to the incompleteness of the DMC. 
 
On the other hand, the owners of the TPS estate will set up an OC according to the DMC. The 
management system is no difference comparing with the private property developments. 
However, due to the mixed tenure in the TPS, the HA is the biggest owners among all the 
estates. Also, the HA also act as developer and the property manager. It is discovered and 
concluded that the incentive of the HA in managing and taking care the estate is a determinant 
factor in affecting the efficiency of the building management in the TPS. However, by 
carrying out case studies, it is supported the incentive of the HA is low. It is try to shrink the 
responsibility to the owners. Therefore, the inefficient management of the OC in the TPS 
estates is due to the lack of incentive of the HA. 
 
Therefore, the two propositions in this dissertation are examined by undergoing analysis of 
documents and case studies.  
 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
The main goal of this dissertation is to find out the causes of the conflicts in the TPS. 
However, due to time limit, the solutions for solving those conflicts are not the focus of this 
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dissertation. Nonetheless, writer would like to suggest some recommendations in solving the 
problems. As the causes of the conflicts are found which is related to the DMC and the 
incentive of the HA, improvement should be done on these two aspects. On one hand, the HA 
should use its discretion to subsidize the unfair maintenance and repair fees caused by the 
incomplete DMC because DMC is not amendable. On the other hand, legislative council 
members can use the political pressure to urge the HA to be a responsible owner in the TPS 
estate and to provide satisfied service for the sitting tenants. 
 
It is not a feasibility study of reinstating the TPS. Nevertheless, writer thinks that it can 
provide a different point of view for consideration to housing policy. Recently, the property 
market of Hong Kong bloom unreasonably. Many people cannot afford to buy their own 
shelter. Many politics and even developers urge the government to reinstate the HOS and TPS 
in order to control the property market. Although the government still does not make up her 
mind to reinstate those policies, there are many proposals for the government consider. The 
writer thinks that economic environment is not the only determinant factor for starting the 
implementation of the TPS. Also, the practical problems in the implementing the scheme has 
to be considered.  
 
 
5.3 Limitation of the Study 
Due to the size of the study and limited time frame, the source of evidence is limited to the 
secondary documentation, including books, journal papers and newspaper clippings. It is 
bound in reviewing the information written by others. Therefore, it may not be as 
comprehensive as collecting some primary data through interviews. 
 
In this dissertation, a general picture is given for the causes of conflicts on the aspect of 
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building management. However, it cannot examine on every specific problem in the TPS, for 
example, neighborhood, resident satisfaction, etc. 
 
 
5.4 Further Research Area 
Buying a flat is an aspiration of many people in Hong Kong due to innate desire of traditional 
culture. For TPS, it is a chance for the low-income sitting tenants to fulfill their aspirations of 
owning their shelters with an affordable price. However, due to the incompleteness of the 
DMC and the lack of incentive of the HA, conflicts always arise in the TPS estates. The 
victims are the owners of the TPS excepting the HA. It is contradicting the rationale of the 
TPS.  
 
As mentioned, it is not a research for finding the solution in solving the conflicts but writer 
thinks that there is a large room for the TPS to improve. Therefore, it is an interesting and 
contributive to conduct a research on this direction so as to provide a fair and efficient 
building management structure for the TPS.  
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Appendix I 
Information of the Tenants Purchase Scheme 
 
 Introduction of the TPS 
  
A Purpose and Scope 
 The Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) was endorsed by the Housing Authority and 
approved by Government in December 1997. The purpose of the scheme is to boost 
home ownership by providing the opportunity for public housing tenants to buy their 
flats at affordable prices. In his October 1997 policy address the Chief Executive 
indicated that at least 250,000 families would be provided with the opportunity to buy 
within ten years. 
  
B Estate Selection 
 The estates initially targeted for sale are those built between 1985 and 1992 (principally 
Trident 3 and 4 blocks). By March 1998 the first four phases, each of around 27,000 
flats, had been announced. Further phases will be announced annually to maintain a 
three-year rolling programme. 
  
C Prices 
 Flat prices represent a substantial discount to market value. A ‘list’ price is determined 
by reference to the adjusted replacement cost, i.e. the current cost of building a flat of the 
specified type inclusive of project management and funding costs and the land cost 
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payment to Government, with a deduction for age and an addition for location. To ensure 
sale prices are affordable (for TPS it is intended that outgoings after purchase should for 
most purchases not exceed twice the rent payable) a ‘special credit’ is made. Purchases 
have a choice of lower discount if they wish. 
  
D Eligibility 
 All tenants in occupation are eligible to buy providing they are – 
(a) not in breach of their tenancy agreement where action is in progress to recover 
possession; 
(b) 18 years of age; 
(c) a permanent resident and have lived in Hong Kong for 7 years; and  
(d) not singletons occupying flats larger than 24 m2 
Note: Market rent-payers are eligible to buy but no special credit is offered 
 
E Resale Restrictions 
 The Schedule to the Housing Ordinance is to be relaxed for both HOS and TPS to 
provide for resale-  
(a) to the HA at the original price for the first two years or at the prevailing TPS price 
(i.e. market value less the discount on initial purchase) in the third to fifth years, 
subject to the return of ‘special credit’ to HA; 
(b) in the secondary market after the first two years; and  
(c) in the open market after five years subject to payment of a premium proportionate to 
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the discount on initial purchase. 
  
F Vacant Flats 
 Letting of vacant flats is suspended three months prior to the schedule date of general 
invitation to purchase. Vacant flats at the date of invitation to buy are offered to families 
in the same estate. Overcrowded families given first priority with remaining flats 
allocated by ballot subject to the flat size not exceeding the maximum for rental housing 
allocation. Remaining or subsequent vacancies will be offered for sale at HOC with 
scheduled sales of HOS flats. The one exception is for single-person flats of up to 24 m2 
which are to be offered by sale to singleton occupiers of flats of 24 m2 or more in the 
same estate by ballot as and when they become available. 
  
G Mortgage Finance 
 The HA offers a mortgage guarantee covering 100% of the balance of the purchase price. 
Some 40 financial institutions are providing mortgage finance at competitive rates and a 
few offer low-start mortgages. 
  
H Management  
 For the initial period at least HA will continue to manage and a new HD management 
model is being implemented for TPS estates. Owners will be encouraged to form 
Owners’ Corporations within the first year, and will be given two years to decide 
whether to retain HA as maanger. 
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I Maintenance 
 The HA provides a 7-years structural guarantee and an undertaking to repair any damage 
from settlement of reclaimed land for a period of ten years from the date of completion. 
An injection of $14,000 for each flat has been made into Maintenance Funds for Phase 1 
estates, estimated to be adequate to cover major maintenance items for up to ten years. 
  
J Building Control 
 Once sales commence, TPS estates become subject to building control under the 
Building Ordinance. To give time for Government to build up resources for the task, 
authority has been delegated to Housing Department to exercise control over TPS estates 
for two years from 7 April 1998. 
  
K Land Rights and Obligations 
 To meet the tight timetable laid down for TPS Phase 1, it was necessary for sales of flats 
to proceed before the Government Lease (GL) and Deed of Mutual Covenant (DMC) 
were finalized. The need to confirm minor amendments to owners’ rights and obligations 
at a late stage lead to some misunderstandings. For Phase 2 onwards the GL and DMC 
will be finalized before sales commence. 
 
For TPS Phase 1, in line with established practice for HOS estates, areas containing 
free-standing HA or Government facilities were ‘carved out’ for management purposes 
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and the DMC related to the ‘remaining portion’ of the lot only. Following the review it is 
intended for Phase 2 onwards to abandon ‘carving out’. In future therefore the DMC will 
cover the whole of the lot, as for most private sector estates. This is more easily 
understood and provides for explicit allocation of rights and obligations in line with the 
holding of undivided shares and management shares. 
  
L Eligibility for HOS, PSPS and HPLS 
 
 Under the approved framework for TPS, TPS owners other than those who later sell on 
the open market may ‘trade up’ by application for HOS or PSPS flats or for an HPLS 
loan under the White Form quota. If successful, the TPS owner will be required to sell 
his flats back to the HA or in the secondary market. 
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